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INTRODUCTION 
The problem of Church-State relations had been a lifelong concern 
of Cardinal Newman. He was definitely not a political theorist and as he 
once said «It has never been my line to take up political or social 
questions unless they come close to me as matters of personal duty*1. 
His concern had always been the cause of religion and his political 
views, which were inseparable from his Christian faith, centered mainly 
on the question of Church-State relations. 
As an Anglican, he spent twelve years at the helm of the Oxford 
Movement whose ultimate goal —the revitalization of the Anglican 
* Director de la Tesis: Prof. Dr. Jose MORALES. Tftulo: Church-State relations in 
Newman. Fecha de defensa: 10.VI.93. 
1. Letters and Diaries (1845-1890). Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain, vol. XXX, 
London-Oxford 1961-1984, p. 209. 
2 3 2 FRANCISCO H . A NIB AN 
Church— was inseparably linked to its freedom from Erastian control 
which demanded Church-State separation. After his conversion, his 
thoughts about Church-State relations developed and matured as he 
confronted the problem posed by religious pluralism in the emerging 
modern society. Thus, in his books, lectures, and correspondence, there 
lies a definite body of thought concerning Church-State relations which 
shed light on the key issues involved in the dialogue between the Church 
and State in the modern world. 
There are relatively few Newman scholars who have actually 
written about Newman's political ideas. Moreover, even though the 
subject of Church-State relations inevitably comes up in these studies, it 
is usually treated from a political point of view2. This work will examine 
Newman's thoughts on the subject from the ecclesiological standpoint 
and more concretely, in relation to the science of Ius Publicum 
Ecclesiasticum. 
Newman certainly did not approach the question with a juridical 
perspective nor was he acquainted with the theories of the school of Ius 
Publicum Ecclesiasticum current during his time. He had always 
adopted a historical and empirical approach to the problem and this 
probably explains why he was able to supersede the classical formula-
tions of the Church-State problematic whose terms had always been the 
ecclesiastical and the political authority. 
Newman started off from a pragmatic acceptance of a sociological 
reality —that of religious pluralism in modern society. This combined 
with his ecumenical attitude towards other religious confessions and his 
deep respect for the individuality and dignity of the human person led 
him to the conviction that Church-State relations in the modern world 
would have to be based on the religious neutrality of the State. 
The object of this work is to present a systematic account and 
analysis of Newman's thoughts on those issues which have acquired 
great relevance to modern-day Church-State relations especially as 
2. Among this collection of studies about Newman's political thoughts, the most 
authoritative are: The Political Thought of John Henry Newman by Terence Kenny published in 
1957 and an article written by Alvan Ryan in 1945 entitled The Development of Newman's 
Political Thought. The more recent studies done on the subject include Factors in the 
Development of Newman's Political Attitudes by J. Derek Holmes (1978) and Newman's Social 
and Political Thinking (1989) by Edward Norman. 
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understood after the Second Vatican Council. It will also show that 
Newman's doctrine on these issues anticipated the teachings of the said 
ecumenical council. 
It starts with a brief account of the status questionis during 
Newman's time in order to set the historical and doctrinal coordinates of 
his Church-State doctrine. This would also show how much Newman 
was ahead of his time in his approach to the question. The exposition of 
Newman's doctrine will hinge on the following issues: dualism, tole-
ration, religious pluralism, religious liberty, and confessionality. 
I. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
1. Rise of modern states 
In 1801, the year Newman was born, the first modern concordat was 
signed between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII. Although it was practi-
cally never implemented and in fact left the Church ever more subject to 
the tight control of the State, it was nevertheless historically significant. 
On one hand, it signified the possibility of establishing a harmonious 
coexistence between the Church and a non-confessional, liberal State. In 
the Concordat, Bonaparte recognized Catholicism as the religion pro-
fessed not by the State but by the majority of French citizens. Such 
recognition —which later would be technically known as sociological 
confessionalism— implies a practical and not merely theoretical dis-
tinction between the State and the people it governs and serves as a legal 
basis for establishing Church-State relations. 
Since then the Concordat has proven to be an effective instrument 
which has allowed the Church to establish formal relations not only with 
non-confessional States but also with atheist and non-Catholic con-
fessional States. On the other hand, it was also a clear indicator of the 
general political trend heading towards the disappearance of the con-
fessional State which called for a profound revision of the system of 
Church-State relations in the doctrinal as well as the practical aspects. 
The first half of the nineteenth century could be considered as the 
period of consolidation of the political revolution which would give rise 
to the modern states founded on liberal democratic principles. This poli-
234 FRANCISCO H. ANIBAN 
tical revolution was propelled by the Enlightenment and culminated in 
the French Revolution of 1789 which proclaimed the enlightened princi-
ples of equality and freedom for all men. Before the end of the century, 
Europe will be transformed into a cluster of independent constitutional 
republics and political power transferred from the absolute monarchs to 
the people as a consequence of the general recognition of the funda-
mental human rights which included the right of suffrage. 
The birth of the modern states inspired by the principles of libera-
lism meant the dismantling of the Christian framework of society which 
had hitherto supported the medieval structure of union between the 
throne and altar accepted throughout Christendom as the ideal and, as it 
were, the natural relationship between the Church and State. In fact, the 
system began to be undermined even a couple of centuries back. The 
rationalist ideas of the Englightenment which gave birth to the tenets of 
liberalism quickly pervaded the intellectual and political circles in the 
nineteenth century creating a general climate of indifferentism towards 
religious matters. 
As religion became less important in the life of society, the de facto 
tolerance of minority religions became the increasing practice and 
towards the middle of the nineteenth century, religious tolerance was the 
general policy upheld by the laws and institutions of many States even 
in cases where it remained officially Catholic or Protestant. Thus in 
England, religious toleration led to the Catholic Emancipation Act of 
1829 and other subsequent political reforms aimed at removing the legal 
impediments which excluded the Catholics from participation in public 
life. In Spain, the Constitution of 1869 explicitly permitted the practice 
of other religions while professing to uphold its obligation to support the 
Catholic religion3. 
3. Cfr. P. LOMBARDÍA, Precedentes del Derecho Eclesiástico Español, in J.M. GONZÁLEZ 
DEL VALLE et al, Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado Español, Pamplona 1983, pp. 151-158. The 
relevant texts of the Constitution of 1869 read: «La Nación se obliga a mantener el culto y los 
ministros de la religión Católica. 
El ejercicio público o privado de cualquier otro culto queda garantizado a todos los 
extranjeros residentes en España, sin más limitación que las reglas universales de la moral y del 
derecho. 
Si algunos españoles profesasen otra religión que la Católica, es aplicable a los mismos todo 
lo dispuesto en el párrafo anterior» 
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The consequence of all these socio-political developments was a 
drastic reduction of the political power and influence which the Catholic 
Church had hitherto wielded. The lost of the temporal sovereignty of the 
Pope with the annexation to Italy of the Papal Estates in 1870 was but 
the logical conclusion of this progressive diminution of Papal temporal 
power. 
The Catholic Church thus fell from a position of imposing authority 
in religious and social life, to that of a weak voice largely ignored in the 
public forums of science and politics. Church-State relations, along with 
religion in general, suffered a diminution of its hitherto enormous theo-
retic and practical importance becoming a relatively insignificant social 
issue especially in the eyes of intellectuals and politicians4. 
In his well-known Biglietto Speech, delivered at the Vatican on the 
occasion of the official announcement of his elevation to the cardinalate, 
Newman expressed the same idea lamenting what he called the great 
apostasy of his age characterized by the progressive and widespread 
secularization of society as a consequence of relegating religion to the 
sphere of the private life of individuals. Before, he said, «it has been 
considered that religion alone, with its supernatural sanctions, was 
strong enough to secure submission of the masses of our population to 
law and order; now the Philosophers and Politicians are bent on 
satisfying this problem without the aid of Christianity* Then he deplo-
red the fact that religion has come to be considered as nothing more than 
«a private luxury which a man may have if he will; but which of course 
he must pay for, and which he must not obtrude upon others, or indulge 
in to their annoyance»5. 
2. Historical antecedents 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen approved 
by the French National Assembly in August 1789 provides a strikingly 
clear illustration of how the situation described above was reflected in 
4. P. AUGUSTTN, O.S.B., Religious Freedom in Church and State, Baltimore 1966, p. 147. 
5. M.K. STROLZ (ed.), John Henry Newman: Commemmorative Essays on the Occasion of 
the Centenary of his Cardinalate, Rome 1979. pp. 99-105. All subsequent citations from this 
speech are taken from this source. 
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the institutions of the State. In the Preamble, there is a reference made to 
the Supreme Being in a typically deistic style which while recognizing 
the existence of God, at the same time smacks of an agnostic attitude 
towards religion. The tenth article of the said declaration which contains 
the clause guaranteeing religious freedom simply states that no one 
should be molested because of his opinions, including religious, as long 
as its manifestation does not alter the public order established by the 
law6. 
It is interesting to note the negative and minimalist tone of this 
article which is supposed to protect the exercise of religious freedom. In 
the first place, it does not explicitly nor implicitly mention the freedom 
to exercise one's religion with all its manifestations. It is rather limited to 
the protection of the freedom to express one's religious opinions as long 
as the public order determined by the law is not perturbed. As is well-
known, the liberal principles on which this declaration was based would 
paradoxically though not inexplicably lead to a stricter and closer super-
vision of the Church by the State tantamount to a virtual restriction of 
the religious freedom of individual Catholics. It must be remembered 
that the French revolution was carried out against a Catholic absolute 
monarchy which explains the hostile tendencies of the post-revolutio-
nary State towards the Church which was practically identified with the 
toppled monarchy. 
In a critical essay written in 1837, Newman fully sympathized with 
De La Mennais's denunciation of the various encroachments of the 
government upon the freedom of the Catholic Church in France. Compa-
ring the situations of the Catholic Church in France and the Anglican 
Church in England, he even expressed his consolation because «the poor 
GalUcan Church is in a captivity, not only doctrinal, which we all know, 
but ecclesiastical, far greater than ours»7. Newman and the English in 
general had always felt a deep aversion for the French Revolution and 
its ideals. For Newman, as will be shown later, it was not so much the 
6. «Nul ne doit être inquieté pour ses opinions, même religieuses, pourvu que leur 
manifestation ne trouble'pas l'ordre public établi par la Loi.» The text is taken from J. HERVADA-
J . M . ZUMAQUERO, Textos Internacionales de Derechos Humanos, Pamplona 1978, p. 51. 
7. Essays Critical and Historical, I. London 1914, p. 140. 
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democratic ideals of liberty and equality which he disliked but the spirit 
of antireligious liberalism which was associated with it 
But perhaps a far more important revolution in the light of the 
development of Church-State relations was the American revolution of 
1776 which produced the first genuine constitutional democracy. The 
famous Virginia Declaration of Rights proclaimed in its article 16 «that 
religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by 
force or violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and 
inalienable right to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates 
of conscience, and that it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian 
forbearance, love, and charity toward each other»8. 
Despite their common ideological roots, there is an obvious contrast 
in the treatment of religious freedom between the American and the 
French Declaration of Rights. As can be observed, the former explicitly 
protects the free exercise of religion and because of its underlying 
Christian ideals even goes so far as to proclaim the duty of all men to 
practise Christian virtues. Firmly and explicitly founded on Christian 
principles and holding religion in highest honor, this recognition of 
religious freedom led to what is called Christian pluralism and even-
tually to religious pluralism. Later in his life, Newman would use the 
same expression found in this article in defense of religious liberty 
saying that «religion must be defended by reason not by violence*9. 
The United States was also the first to establish the separation of 
Church and State enforced by the first amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution which reads: «Congress shall make no law respecting an esta-
blishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...*10. This 
rather succinct statement contains the essence of the doctrine of sepa-
ration between Church and State destined to shape the development of 
Church-State relations in the modern world11. 
8 . J. HERVADA-J.M. ZUMAQUERO, Textos..., cit., p. 3 5 . 
9 . Letters and Diaries, X X , p. 4 7 7 . 
1 0 . Cfr. E . A . S M I T H , Religious Liberty in the United States, Philadelphia 1 9 7 2 , pp. 2 4 6 -
2 6 2 . 
1 1 . Cfr. P. LOMBARDIA, Síntesis Histórica, in J.M. GONZÁLEZ DEL VALLE et al. Derecho 
Eclesiástico..., cit., pp. 7 4 - 8 1 . 
238 FRANCISCO H . ANIBAN 
Newman neither praised nor criticized this form of liberal sepa-
ratism between Church and State in his writings. At most he made a 
reference to this separatist doctrine revealing a somewhat skeptical 
attitude about its practical application. He pointed out how even among 
the miscellaneous and liberty-loving sects of the American Union», the 
problem of State interference in ecclesiastical affairs could still arise. 
«There an Independent or Baptist communion, we believe, 
cannot expel one of its members without showing cause to the 
State that the proceeding is equitable. Why? Because the reli-
gious body being chartered for the legal possession of property, 
excommunication is a civil injury to the ejected party, unless he 
has violated the fundamental rules of corporation. Profession of 
certain doctrines may, of course, be made one of the conditions 
of membership, and when the case turns upon points of doctrine, 
the State does not interfere, but the previous question, whether or 
not it is a point of doctrine that is in dispute, falls, as we 
understand, under the cognizance of the civil courts*12. 
From the above remarks made by Newman a few years before his 
conversion, one could perceive his basic attitude regarding the separa-
tion of Church and State. He was not criticizing the doctrine of separa-
tion which he would begin to support as early as 1844; he was rather 
indicating some flaws in the system which could make its practical 
application difficult13. 
3. Catholic doctrine 
In contrast to the sweeping political, social, and intellectual revolu-
tions taking place around her, the Church's official doctrine on Church-
State relations remained unchanged. The doctrine based on the medieval 
hieratic principle which puts the Pope at the apex of both spiritual and 
civil power was essentially maintained although as pointed out earlier, in 
12. Essays Critical and Historical, I, pp. 151-152. 
13. Cfr. J.D. HOLMES Factors in the Development of Newman's Political Attitudes, in 
James D. BASTABLE (ed.), Newman and Gladstone Centennial Essays, Dublin 1978, p. 63. 
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practice, the Church's authority in political and temporal affairs was 
virtually unrecognized if not totally hindered by the political system14. 
The Church cannot be accused, however, of lethargy in responding 
to the demands of the times. In fact, the Church reacted vigorously with 
her outright condemnation of those liberal propositions based on the a 
priori denial of any dogmatic principle and indifference to religious 
matters. The liberal ideal of the separation between Church and State 
was regarded by the Church as a direct consequence of these doctrinal 
errors and opposed it as such. In so doing, she had no alternative but to 
doggedly defend the medieval system of alliance between throne and 
altar which meant formal union between Church and State. 
The first significant step towards the evolution of Church-State 
doctrine adapting it to the exigencies of modern times was finally made 
by Pope Leo XIII four years before Newman's death. His encyclical 
Immortale Dei (September 1, 1885) contained the first clear and abstract 
statement of the mutual independence and autonomy of the Church and 
State. The hieratic principle was definitely abandoned with this recogni-
tion not only of the absolute autonomy but also of the sovereignty of the 
State in all temporal affairs. 
Expressing this doctrine in words which brings to mind the first 
official formulation of the principle of dualism made by Pope Gelasius 
in the year 494, the encyclical declared: «The Almighty, therefore, has 
given the charge of the human race to two powers, the ecclesiastical and 
14. In the doctrinal aspect, the greatest progress was reached in the early seventeenth 
century with the theory advanced by two Jesuit theologians, Francis Suarez and Robert 
Bellarmine. Based on St. Thomas' doctrine, which asserts that the king's power comes from God 
through the people immediately, they denied that the Pope has direct power in temporal affairs. 
St. Thomas held that the king is supreme in temporal affairs and the Church in spiritual but he 
emphasised that since all things must be ordered according to their final end, the Church is 
superior to the State and has the power to direct the State in matters pertaining to man's 
supernatural goal. The Popes thus enjoyed what amounted to almost universal power over kings 
and that power was so real that the Pope can dethrone kings and dissolve his subjects of oaths of 
loyalty. (Cfr. Comment, super libros sent., II, dist XLIV, q.2, art. 3) Bellarmine, on the other 
hand, laid more stress on the king's supremacy in temporal affairs. He admitted that the Church 
could and should direct temporal affairs to their supernatural end but pointed out that any 
specifically temporal measures required by the Church to accomplish her end were strictly 
accidental to her nature and could only be justified when they were really necessary for the 
exercise of her spiritual duties. By upholding the inviolability of the king's authority, 
Bellarmine's doctrine indirectly censures any political pretensions of the Pope. (Cfr. P. AGUSTIN, 
Religious Freedom..., cit., pp. 169-170.) 
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the civil, the one being set over divine, and the other over human, things. 
Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits within which it is 
contained, limits which are defined by the nature and special object of 
the province of each so that there is, we may say, an orbit traced out 
within which the action of each is brought into play by its own native 
right»15. 
Conditions were simply not yet ripe, however, in order to comple-
tely put aside the traditional doctrine of Church-State union. Thus, wi-
thout proposing it as a doctrine de fide, Leo XIII maintained the 
necessity of this union as well as the duty of the State to profess the true 
religion and to support it. Faithful to the teachings of his predecessors, 
he insisted: 
«Since, then, no one is allowed to be remiss in the service due 
to God, and since the chief duty of all men is to cling to religion 
in both its teaching and practice —not such religion as they may 
have a preference for, but the religion which God enjoins, and 
which certain and most dear marks show to be the only one true 
religion— it is a public crime to act as though there were no God. 
So, too, it is a sin for the State not to have care for religion, as a 
something beyond its scope, or as of no practical benefit; or out 
of many forms of religion to adopt that one which chimes in with 
the fancy; for we are bound absolutely to worship God in that 
way which He has shown to be His will. Ail who rule, therefore, 
should hold in honor the holy name of God, and one of their chief 
duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the 
credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact 
any measure that may compromise its safety»16. 
In his concern to restrain the forces of liberalism intent on elimi-
nating religion from the social life of the Christian nations of Europe, 
Pope Leo XUI had no choice but to reassert this traditional teaching with 
its ideal of formal union between Church and State. Some authors have 
pointed out that, considering the historical circumstances and the context 
of the entire Leonine corpus dealing with the Church-State problem, it 
may be held that the Pope called not so much for a formal union as for 
1 5 . A S S 1 8 ( 1 8 8 5 ) p. 1 6 6 . 
1 6 . Ibid., pp. 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 . 
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active cooperation on the part of the State to promote the exercise of 
religion. He still judged, however, that this cooperation can only be 
carried out effectively through the union of Church and State17. 
If one considers the antireligious bent of the separatist doctrine of 
the modern European liberals, it is easier to understand the caution with 
which Leo XIII had to handle the issue of separation between Church 
and State. He makes an explicit reference to this tendency in his ency-
clical Libertas Praestantissimum (June 20, 1888) which complements 
the previous encyclical Immortale Dei. Rejecting the liberalist notion of 
Church-State separation, he censured the inconsistency of those so-
called moderate liberals «who affirm that the morality of individuals is 
to be guided by the divine law, but not the morality of the State, so that 
in public affairs the commands of God may be passed over, and may be 
entirely disregarded in the framing of laws. Hence, follows the fatal 
theory of the need of separation between Church and State*18. 
It is worth noting that some years later, the same Pope would refer 
to the Church-State separation in the United States in his encyclical 
Longinqua Oceani (January 18, 1901) expressing his positive overall 
evaluation of the system. But even though the laws and the faithfulness 
of the people earned his sincere praise, he nevertheless warned that no 
one should conclude that the system would be universally good or 
lawful. This warning only manifested that he was not totally convinced 
that separation between Church and State could be compatible with love 
and respect for religion. Thus, for him it remained to be a choice 
between formal union and the unacceptable liberalist solution. 
With respect to religious pluralism in society, Pope Leo XIII firmly 
maintained the traditional doctrine about religious tolerance based on the 
moral principle denying error the right to exist and to be propagated. 
However, he manifested greater flexibility and understanding towards 
factual situations accepting the phenomenon of pluralism in modern 
society and showing a certain willingness to adapt the doctrinal princi-
17. Cfr. J. COURTNEY MURRAY, Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State, in 
«Theological Studies* 1 4 ( 1 9 5 3 ) pp. 1 4 5 - 2 1 4 . 
1 8 . ASS 2 0 ( 1 8 8 7 ) p. 6 1 1 . Cfr. G. REDONDO, La Iglesia en el Mundo Contemporaneo, II , 
Pamplona 1 9 7 9 , pp. 3 3 - 4 9 . 
242 FRANCISCO H . ANIBAN 
pies to the conditions imposed by the reality. This is evident in the 
following words of the encyclical Libertas Praestantissimum: 
«Yet with the discernment of a true mother, the Church weighs 
the great burden of human weakness, and well knows the course 
down which the minds and actions of men are in this our age 
being borne... For this reason, while not conceding any right to 
anything save what is right and honest, she does not forbid public 
authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice, for 
the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preser-
ving some greater good»19. 
In effect, without renouncing the binomial principle of confessiona-
lism and tolerance, the doctrine of Pope Leo XIII had a tone of flexibi-
lity which did not leave it closed to the possibility of further deve-
lopment in the process of adapting Church-State doctrine to the social 
and ideological realities of the modern world. 
Whether there was any direct influence or not, practically all of 
Newman's basic thoughts on Church-State relations have found its way 
into the Church-State doctrine of the Pope who raised him to the cardi-
nalate in recognition of his achievements. But the discussion in this 
chapter will show that Newman was prepared to go and indeed went 
farther than the Pope in proposing an alternative solution to the ever 
vexatious problem of Church-State relations in the modern world. 
It should be pointed out that his keen discernment of socio-political 
trends sharpened by the reality of his experience under the Erastian 
Anglican Church and later as a member of a minority religion in a 
confessional State have placed him in a better position to judge that the 
new age was demanding a deeper overhaul of the Church-State 
machinery which can only be achieved by adopting a different approach 
to the problem. Newman did tackle the problem in a different way and 
in doing so, he came up with a solution which clearly anticipated the 
teachings of the Second Vatican Council. 
The fact was that Pope Leo XIII was definitely acquainted with 
Newman's ideas and the accusations against him for being too liberal. 
There is a revealing anecdote in connection with Newman's elevation to 
19. ASS 20 (1887) p. 609. 
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the cardinalate in 1879 showing the Pontiffs favorable reception of his 
doctrine: 
«Leo XIII received the petition of the English Catholics all the 
more favourably as it appears that of his own accord he had had 
the same desire from the very beginning. Being asked by 
Monsieur de Rossi soon after his election, What would be his 
policy as Pope? he had answered, Wait till you see my first 
Cardinal; that will show you what will be typical of my reign. It 
was believed that in these words he was referring to 
Newman...»20. 
II. NEWMAN'S DUALISM 
1. The principle of dualism 
The principle of dualism is a uniquely Christian concept which 
Christianity introduced into the world. Its origin can be traced to the 
terse reply Jesus gave to the pharisees asking Him whether it was lawful 
to pay the tribute to Caesar: «Give to Caesar the things that are Caesar's 
and to God the things that are God's» (ML 22:21, Mk. 12:17, Lk. 20:25) 
It has since supported the Church's claim that the government of human 
society had been entrusted to a dyarchy: the hierarchy of the Church 
entrusted with religious or spiritual matters and the civil authority whose 
task is to promote the temporal good of society21. 
The first official statement of this principle is found in a letter 
written in 494 by Pope Gelasius to Atanasius I, emperor of the Roman 
empire in the orient. Protesting against the abuses resulting from the 
latter's intervention in ecclesiastical affairs, the Roman Pontiff reminded 
the emperor that «There are two principles, August Emperor, by which 
the world is primarily ruled: the sacred authority of the Pontiffs and the 
royal power». The principle of dualism, though it may be satisfied in 
20. P. T H U R E A U - D A N G I L , English Catholic Revival in the Nineteenth Century, U, New 
York, n.d., p. 359. Cited in A. RYAN, The Development of Newman's Political Thought, in «The 
Review of Politics* 7 (1945) p. 236. 
21. Cfr. C . S O L E R , Sobre el Papel del Dualismo Cristiano en la Ginesis de la Libertad 
Religiosa, in «Ius Canonicum* XXX (1990) pp. 287-304. 
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many ways, demands one single thing which is truly essential and that is 
the independence of the Church which can be translated as the recogni-
tion on the part of the State of its incompetence in religious matters. 
This apparently simple principle has raised untold problems which 
scarcely existed before the advent of Christianity. It was certainly 
unknown in the pagan and even in the Jewish societies where the State 
or civil authority also had the care of religion. Indeed, it can be said that 
the complex history of Church-State relations is the history of the 
adjustment of the respective claims of the Church and State in order to 
observe this divine principle. Erastianism or Caesarism and hierocratism 
are the two opposite extremes which result when the State and the 
Church respectively choose to ignore this principle and overstep the 
limits of their respective competences. 
2. Distinction between Church and State 
The first problem inherent to this principle is the proof of its vali-
dity. As Newman affirmed: «Erastianism is the doctrine of common 
sense, and must be very clearly negatived in scripture if it is to be 
discarded*. The State has no need to prove its claim for sovereignty and 
autonomy with respect to the Church because being prior to ecclesias-
tical authority in history, it is in possession. «He was in possession in the 
age when Christ came; he is in possession now in the minds of men, and 
in the prima facie view of human society. He is in possession, because 
the benefits he confers on mankind are tangible,and obvious to the world 
at large»22. 
The limitation of the principle of dualism as an argument to claim 
the Church's sovereignty and independence is immediately evident if we 
consider the case of a pluralist society governed by laicist or agnostic 
State for the proof of this principle requires an act of faith. Nevertheless, 
the principle of dualism —the conviction that the Church has rights 
which the State could not touch— is and will always be the internal 
basis of the Church's claim for her freedom and independence with 
respect to the political community. 
22. Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching, I, Westminster MD 1969, 
p. 199. (Hereafter, this work will be designated by the abbreviation Diff.). 
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As could be expected, Newman's argument in favor of this principle 
starts from empirical facts rather than revealed truths. In the first place, 
he points out that in fact, the Church and the State are two different 
societies sovereign within its own realm and whose missions are also 
distinct. The weight of his argument to claim the mutual independence 
of Church and State rests on the absurdity of having two societies set up 
for the same purpose. Thus, he criticized Whately for stressing the 
distinction of the Church from the State because of its supernatural 
character and divine attributes but without giving it a specific mission to 
accomplish to justify the necessity of its existence as a distinct society. 
For Newman, the distinction between Church and State is more 
radical. The natures of the two societies pertain to two different orders 
such that they are mutually incapable of carrying out the mission of the 
other. If this were not the case, the logical thing would be to subordinate 
to the State its functions just like the Jewish society and other pagan 
societies before Christianity was introduced into the world. «An institu-
tion was formed upon a new idea, and to it was transferred a portion of 
that authority which hitherto had centered in the State, and independence 
bestowed on it; but surely only because it was able to do something 
which ancient philosophy and statesmanship had not dreamed of. Unless 
the duties of the Church had been different, or if they had been but 
partially different from the duties of the State, it is obvious to ask, for 
what conceivable reason should two societies be set up to do the work of 
one?»2 3. 
But Newman also knew that the problem posed by Church-State 
dyarchy would not be settled by simply distinguishing the missions and 
the spheres of competence of each society. The principle of dualism 
does hold the key to a harmonious relationship between Church and 
State but its practical application has too often proven to be far from a 
simple mathematical procedure. It is not enough to define the domain of 
each society and say that one should not interfere in the activities of the 
other. In practice, it is not always easy to draw the line dividing the 
matters which fall under the jurisdiction of either society and the 
23. Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
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difficulty is aggravated when it comes to matters which pertain to the 
competence of both societies24. 
Newman expresses this difficulty pointing out the source of the 
problem: «The very same persons and the very same things belong to 
two supreme jurisdictions at once, so that the Church cannot issue any 
order but it affects the persons and the things of the State; nor can the 
State issue any order, without its affecting the persons and things of the 
Church» Moreover, he adds «the very matters which in one aspect are 
supernatural, in another are secular»25. 
Newman did not propose any kind of theory asserting the potestas 
indirecta of the Church in temporal matters as a solution to possible 
collisions of jurisdiction between Church and State. There is no question 
in his mind that the superiority of the supernatural order also means the 
superiority of the Church over the State in the sense affirmed by St. 
Thomas Aquinas. 
Although he does so in a hypothetical manner, Newman also 
affirms that if the Church is independent of the State and the latter 
recognizes her as a divine institution, then logically it must submit to 
her. The State which makes a profession of faith must accept the 
sovereignty of the Church as demanded by her divine nature and submit 
itself to her teachings. «If the Church is independent of the State, so far 
as she is a messenger from God, therefore, should the State, with its high 
officials and its subject masses come into communion, it is plain that 
they must at once change hostility into submission*26. This does not 
mean, however, that the Church should wield some form of temporal 
authority over the State. The superiority of the Church should be main-
tained without detriment to the legitimate autonomy of the temporal 
order. 
Newman's opposition towards the ultramontanists clearly shows his 
position with respect to this issue. The Church does not have a natural 
title or right to exercise political authority. If she did so in the past, it 
was not because she was exercising her right but simply because it was a 
24. Cfr. J. COULSON, Newman and the Common Tradition (A Study in the Language of 
Church and Society), London 1970, p. 252. 
25. Diff., I, p. 173. 
26. Ibid., p. 201. 
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right or a privilege attributed to her by the people or by the civil 
authority. Newman's opinion, moreover, was that the temporal power 
given to the Church is more harmful that beneficial to her mission. He 
even considered it as an encumbrance rather than a guarantee of papal 
independence and so he was actually in favor of the lost of temporal 
authority of the Pope2 7. 
Newman, who always looked at facts and based his thoughts on 
them points out that «the civil power has the power of the sword, and the 
Church has no arms but such as are spiritual*28. The Church's sovereign 
jurisdiction must therefore be recognized and accepted freely by the 
State or she simply has no way of imposing it on the civil authority. But 
if this had proven to be a source of great conflicts even in the Christen-
dom of the middle ages, then it can hardly be expected to be a pacific 
issue in modern society. The Church has to live with the fact that nature 
and propensity of the State is to have an abhorrence for double juris-
diction and what it calls a divided allegiance. «Aut Caesar aut nullus is 
its motto, nor does it willinglly accept of any compromise*29. 
Moreover, the Church and the State follow a different code of 
principles in their operation. In seeking the maximum temporal benefits 
for its citizens, the State often opts for short term goals and at times has 
little regard for the moral consequences of its actions. «The world's 
measure of good and scope of action*, Newman contends, «are so diffe-
rent from those of the Church... The Church, though she embraces all 
conceivable virtues in her teaching, and every kind of good, temporal as 
well as spiritual, in her exertions, does not survey them from the same 
point of view, or classify them in the same order as the world. She 
makes secondary what the world considers indispensable: she places 
27. Cfr. Sermons Preached on Various Occasions (1850-1873), Westminster MD 1968, 
pp. 281-316. In the sermon entitled «The Pope and the Revolution*, which Newman preached on 
the day of prayer ordered for Pius IX in 1866, he pointed out that the temporal possessions of the 
Pope were given by men and not by God, and implied that the temporal power of the Pope was 
not necessarily a good thing. Although he described those who seized the papal states as 
sacrilegious robbers, he argued that no one could force a sovereign on a people who deliberately 
rejected him. He also carefully avoided giving the impression that the temporal power was 
necessary for the papacy and even suggested that its end might be imminent. During the First 
Vatican Council, and in opposition to the ultramontanes, Newman refused to extend the exercise 
of papal infallibility to the field of politics and in particular to the declarations of the Syllabus. 
28. Diff. I, p. 174. 
29. Ibid., p. 175. 
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first what the world does not even recognize, or undervalues, or dislikes, 
or thinks impossible...*30. 
A quick glance at the uncrupulous legislations of many countries in 
matters involving moral principles will readily confirm this observation 
of Newman. Many of these laws disregard the natural moral order which 
legislatures in general tend to ignore or are quite willing to sacrifice on 
the pretext of gaining greater temporal benefits for society. This attitude 
clearly manifests the wide discrepancy between the Church and the State 
in their understanding of man, his dignity, and his destiny. As Newman 
said in one of his sermons: «The Church and the world cannot meet 
without either the world rising or the Church falling; and the world for-
sooth pleads necessity, and says it cannot rise to the Church, and deems 
the Church unreasonable when she will not descend instead*31. 
There is no doubt that the Church not only has the right but also the 
duty to interfere in matters concerning the moral order since it directly 
affects man's spiritual welfare. The Church, however, should only 
employ such means that are in keeping with her nature and her aim3 2. 
Drawing some lessons from history, particularly in the conflict 
between St. Ambrose and the emperor Valentinian, Newman saw how 
the teaching authority of the Church could be made to prevail over the 
civil authority without she herself getting involved in political conflicts. 
«There is a state of society, in which the limitation of despotism is by 
the voice of the people so unequivocally committed to an external autho-
rity... such is the recognition of the authority of Religion, as existing in 
its substantive institutions, external to the strictly political framework, 
which even in pagan countries has been at times successfully used to 
curb the extravagances of absolute power*33. 
In other words, Newman was suggesting here that the Christian laity 
should take upon themselves the duty and responsibility of defending 
and promoting the objective moral order in society by exercising their 
rights as citizens in the service of the Church. In fact, Newman 
30. Ibid., p. 263. 
31. Parochial and Plain Sermons (1834-1843), IV, Westminster MD, 1968, p. 161. 
32. Cfr. Apologia Pro Vita Sua 1864. Edited by Martin J. Svaglic, Oxford 1967, pp. 46-
47; Diff. I, p. 175; H . A . MACDOUGALL, The Acton-Newman Relations: The Dilemma of Christian 
Liberalism, New York 1962, pp. 144-153. 
33. Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects (1836-1866), London 1911, p. 321. 
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understood clearly that the mission and responsibility of the laity in the 
Church would acquire a special importance as a result of the separation 
between Church and State34. 
3. Cooperation 
Still, the State would do well to recognize the Church as her ally 
instead of a political rival. For, as Newman asserts, «the greatest 
principles of the State are those of the Church, and, if the State would 
but keep within its own province, it would find the Church its truest ally 
and best benefacton>35. In these words is summed up a whole program of 
fruitful cooperation between the Church and State. 
There cannot be any real opposition between the spiritual goods 
sought by the Church and the temporal goods sought by the State. The 
natural moral order cannot be violated with impunity and when the 
world turns its back against its Creator, sooner or later it ends up 
destroying itself and fails to attain even its natural end. Thus, the Church 
could perform a great service to the State because being the guardian of 
the natural law and its rightful interpreter, she is the infallible guide that 
can lead human society to its true and proper end. 
The Church is the best ally of the State because she not only 
recognizes and accepts the sovereignty of the State but teaches it as part 
of her doctrine. Always true and unchanging in her teachings, she also 
instills in her people many virtues and values which are beneficial to the 
well-being of the State among them obedience to civil authority and the 
faithful fulfillment of social obligations. Moreover, she can be relied 
upon to perform various tasks, particularly in education and in 
humanitarian efforts, in cooperation with the State or on her own initia-
tive. Thus «she fulfills a number of secondary ends, and is the means of 
numberless temporal blessings to any country which receives her*36. 
34. Cfr. The Arians of the Fourth Century, Westminster MD 1968, pp. 257-259; 
P. CHAVASSE, Newman and the Laity, in S. JAKI (ed.), Newman Today, San Francisco 1989, 
pp. 49-75. 
35. Diff. I, p. 175. 
36. Ibid., p. 233. 
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The cooperation between Church and State could be carried out 
even if the State were laicist. Church-State union is not necessary for 
this cooperation and Newman was even inclined to think that Church-
State union in this case could even constitute a threat to the indepen-
dence of the Church. Newman's experience of the negative consequen-
ces of having an Established Church made him extremely wary of the 
State's tendency to instrumentalize the Church in the pursuit of political 
ends. 
He expressed this distrust of the State's capacity to cooperate 
sincerely with the Church in saying that «Kings and statesmen may be, 
and have been, saints; but, in being such, they have acted againsts the 
interests of kingcraft and statesmanship. The very moment the State 
enters into the Church, it shows its nature and its propensities, and takes 
up a position which it has never changed and never will»37. 
Because of this tendency of the State to use religion or the Church 
as a political instrument, Newman arrived at the conclusion that only the 
Catholic Church is endowed with that organizational structure capable 
of resisting domination by the State. Catholicity, therefore, is the only 
guarantee against that tendency of the State and «a church cannot cast 
off Catholic intercommunion without falling under the power of the 
State»38. 
A branch church will always eventually end up being nationalized 
by the State. And a national church, whose mission is absorbed and 
becomes identified with that of the State, ends up being an ideology 
instead of a religion. Under this enslavement, dogma and liturgy are 
easily sacrificed for the sake of political expedience. «Dogma would be 
sacrificed to expedience, sacraments would be rationalized, perfection 
would be ridiculed if she was made the slave of the State»3 9. Like the 
branch that is cut off from the vine, the Church withers and dies. 
The exercise of Erastian control by the British Parliament over the 
Anglican Church in order to interfere in dogmatic and liturgical ques-
tions opened Newman's eyes to the undesirability of an Established 
Church. In an Established Church, where the distinction between the 
37. Ibid., pp. 385-386. 
38. Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
39. Ibid., p. 102. 
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Church and the State is obscured and the two are practically identified, 
the Church inevitably falls under the power of the State and her mission 
is absorbed in that of the State. 
Newman was aware that the Catholic Church was suffering under 
the same circumstances and so he was able to say after his conversion 
comparing the situation of the Catholic Church in confessional States to 
that in England «1 have a decided view that Catholicism is safer and 
more free under a constitutional regime, such as our own than under any 
othe^ 4 0 . 
From the preceeding discussion, it can be said that the principle of 
dualism, for Newman, has one essential objective and that is to guaran-
tee the independence of the Church. This independence is the result of 
the proper distinction between the Church and the State based on their 
natures and their missions. In order to carry out her mission, the Church 
does not require anything from the State other than this freedom to carry 
out her mission. The only thing the Church demands from civil authority 
is freedom to fulfill her mission. «A11 she asks is an open field, and 
freedom to act. She asks no patronage from the civil power: in former 
times and places she has asked it...because in certain ages it has been the 
acknowledged mode of acting...but her history shows that she needed it 
not» 4 1. 
There is a very striking similarity between these words and those 
uttered by Pope Paul VI more than a century later in his discourse to 
statesmen after the Second Vatican Council «And what is it that the 
Church asks of you, after almost two thousand years of all manner of 
vicissitudes in her relations with you, the powers of earth —what is it 
that she asks of you today? In one of the major texts of the Council she 
has told you what it is. She asks you nothing but freedom— freedom to 
believe and to preach her faith, freedom to love God and to serve Him, 
freedom to live and to bring to men her message of life» 4 2. 
40. Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects, p. 307. 
41. Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations, Westminster MD 1906, p. 283. 
42. AAS, 58 (1966) pp. 10-11 In connection with this subject, the Conciliar Declaration 
Dignitatis Humanae, no. 13 states: Among those things which pertain to the good of the Church 
and indeed to the good of society here on earth which must everywhere and at all times be 
safeguarded and defended from all harm, the most outstanding surely is that the Church enjoy 
that freedom of action which her responsibility for the salvation of man requires. This is a sacred 
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in. C H U R C H - S T A T E S E P A R A T I O N 
Some authors believe that there was a substantial change in 
Newman's thinking on Church-State relations but a more careful reading 
of his works would easily demonstrate that this change was rather a 
development of his early convictions4 3. In his Essay on the Development 
of Christian Doctrine, Newman gave an account of the process of deve-
lopment which aptly describes the development of Church-State 
doctrine which took place in his own thoughts and in the Church's 
magisterium. 
«But whenever the risk of corruption from intercourse with the 
world around, such a risk must be encountered if a great idea is to 
be duly understood, and much more if it is to be fully exhibited. 
It is elicited and expounded by trial, and battles into perfection 
and supremacy... Its vital element needs disengaging from what 
is foreign and temporary, and is employed in efforts after free-
dom which become more vigorous and hopeful as its years 
increase. Its beginnings are no measure of its capabilities nor of 
its scope... From time to time it makes essays which fail, and are 
in consequence abandoned. It seems in suspense which way to 
go; it waivers, and at length strikes out in one definite direction. 
In time it enters upon strange territory, points of controversy alter 
their bearings; parties rise and fall around it; dangers and hopes 
appear in new relations and old principles reappear under new 
forms. It changes with them in order to remain the same. In a 
higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, 
and to be perfect is to have changed often*4 4. 
Newman has been branded by some authors as conservative and 
some have accused him of being too liberal45. Both classifications reflect 
a limited knowledge of Newman and his works. The key to understand 
liberty with which the only-begotten Son of God endowed the Church he purchased with His 
blood. Indeed it belongs so intimately to the Church that to attack it is to oppose the will of God. 
The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle governing relations between the Church 
and public authorities and the whole civil order. 
43. Cfr. A . RYAN, The Development..., cit., pp. 236-240. 
44. Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, Westminster MD 1968, pp. 39-40. 
45. Cfr. M . O'CONNELLL, Newman and Liberalism, in S. JAKI (ed.), Newman Today, cit., 
pp. 79-91. 
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the paradox of Newman's conservatism and liberalism lies in his theory 
of the process of development of ideas. This theory supports conserva-
tism by its reverence for tradition but in distinguishing what is essential 
from what is accidental, what is permanent from what is temporal, 
remains open to change. Newman's basic position is the ready accep-
tance of development without break of continuity as manifested in living 
organisms. 
Several years before the start of the Oxford Movement in 1833, 
Newman had already acquired the firm conviction that the independence 
of the Church is a doctrine de fide. There is a fragment from his 
Autobiographical Writings wherein he acknowledges having learned this 
doctrine from Dr. Whately which goes «On looking back (1822-1826), 
he found that one momentous truth of Revelation, he had learned from 
Dr. Whately, and that was the idea of the Christian Church, as a divine 
appointment, and as a substantive visible body, independent of the State, 
and endowed with rights, prerogatives, and powers of its own» 4 6 . This 
conviction would be further strengthened as he discovers its confirma-
tion in the writings of the Fathers of the Church, particularly the doctrine 
of the Apostolic Succession. 
At the same time, true to his conservative temperament, he was a 
natural upholder of the status quo and therefore a supporter of the 
Anglican Church as an Establishment. Reinforced by the influence of 
Keble and Froude, he made a close association between political conser-
vatism and religious purity in the sense that the maintenance of external 
political forms would guarantee the integrity of religious traditions. 
Newman felt that the best way to hold back the rising forces of 
liberalism which was threatening to violate this integrity was the firm 
establishment of political and religious dogma mutually supporting each 
other. 
In a letter written to his mother dated March 13, 1829, Newman put 
forward the reasons why he feared the thought of disestablishment: «1 do 
believe it (Anglican Church) will ultimately be separated from the State 
and at this prospect I look with apprehension, 1) because all revolutions 
are awful things and the effect of this revolution is unknown; 2) because 
46. Autobiographical Writings, edited by Henry Tristam, New York 1957, p. 69. 
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upper classes will be left almost religionless; 3) because there will not 
be that security for sound doctrine without change which is given by an 
Act of Parliament; 4) because the Clergy will be thrown on their Con-
gregations for voluntary contributions*47. It is interesting to note that 
even at that time his support for the Establishment was motivated only 
by practical reasons and not based on any doctrinal principle. 
The convictions he expressed in the above letter began to be shaken 
with the rise of the Whigs to power in Parliament. It gradually dawned 
on him that the Establishment Church was becoming Erastian and that 
Parliament —through its liberal sacrilegious reforms— was becoming a 
threat rather than a support to the Church. Consequently, his opinion 
about the Establishment also began to change. In the next few years, his 
position, along with that of Keble will change abruptly in response to the 
shifting political currents and the blustery enthusiasm of Hurrell Froude, 
to whom the separation from the apostatizing State came to seem the 
essential prerequisite for the spiritual regeneration of the Church. 
By 1833, Keble would boldly declare: «1 look upon them (Church 
and State) as virtually dissolved, and as soon as they are avowedly the 
better: as far as my poor wit can discern, anything almost is better for 
true Religion than going on in union with a Whig State*4 8. That same 
year, Newman would write in the Lyra Apostolica the following verses 
which Froude would later quote at the end of Tract No. 59 which he 
entitled State Interference in Matters Spiritual: 
«How long, O Lord of grace 
Must languish thy true race 
In a forced friendship linked 
with Belial here*. 
It was also around this time that it had first occurred to Newman 
that the Church is essentially a popular institution, and the past English 
union of it with the State has been a happy anomaly49. It would take 
some time, however, for these ideas to mature and so as late as 1836 he 
47. Letters and Diaries, U, p. 130. 
48. Cited in P. BRENDON, Hurrell Froude and the Oxford Movement, London 1974, p. 96. 
49. Historical Sketches (1824-1860), I, Westminster MD 1970, pp. 340-342. 
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could still speak of the duty of Christian government to uphold the 
Church50. 
It is also well known that Newman acted as a brake to restrain the 
radical tendencies of Hurrell Froude. Newman desired the separation of 
Church and State but he did not want the Oxford Movement to be 
directly responsible for it. He would rather wait for the Bishops to do it 
or wait till the State itself dissociated from the Church. 
In a letter written in the early days of the Oxford Movement to 
Frederic Rogers, Newman would attest to this: 
«1, of course, think that the most natural and becoming state of 
things is for the aristocratical power to be the upholder of the 
Church; yet I cannot deny the plain fact that in most ages the 
latter has been based on a popular power. It was so in its rise, in 
the days of Ambrose and in the days of Becket, and it will be so 
again I am preparing myself for such a state of things, and for 
this simple reason, because the State has deserted us and we 
cannot help ourselves. You must not think however, that I mean 
to hasten the downfall of the Monarchy by word or deed. I trust 
the Whigs and Radicals will reap their proper glory, and we but 
enjoy their fruit without committing ourselves*51. 
This hesitation to assume responsibility for the disestablishment of 
the Anglican Church could be explained by Newman's attachment to 
English traditions and his resolve to keep the Oxford Movement out of 
politics. Newman was essentially in agreement with Froude in working 
for the disestablishment but they differed in their idea of how to accom-
plish it. Froude wanted to aim directly at disestablishment in order to 
leave the Church entirely in the hands of ecclesiastical authority while 
Newman hoped that by strengthening the ecclesiastical authority 
through a deeper consciousness of its Apostolic descent, Erastianism 
would die a natural death. In short, Froude anticipated ecclesiastical 
disestablishment while Newman looked for doctrinal development52. 
50. Cfr. Letters and Diaries, V, p. 301. «... of course I hold it to be the duty of a Christian 
government to uphold the Church». 
51. Letters and Diaries, IV, 35. 
52. Cfr. P. BRENDON, Hurrell Froude..., cit., p. 145. 
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Newman's idea ultimately prevailed among the Tractarians and so 
the Tracts for the Times concentrated on doctrinal issues particularly 
those that could reinforce the doctrine of the Apostolic Succession. But 
as Newman would later assert, the Tractarian Movement and the Esta-
blishment was in simple antagonism from the first. It aimed to reform 
the Anglican Church by injecting a new spirit into it and purifying it of 
its Protestant contamination. But this new spirit is nothing else but the 
old Catholic and Apostolic tradition. Thus every attempt to infuse a 
Catholic spirit into the Anglican Church was a direct attack against the 
Establishment. From its beginnings, the Oxford Movement sought to 
achieve the disestablishment of the Anglican Church as the only means 
to destroy Erastianism53. 
The very first tract written by Newman contains a subltle but 
nonetheless clear allusion to this aspiration when it says «... the day may 
come, even in this generation, when the Representatives of Christ are 
spoiled of their sacred possessions and degraded from their civil digni-
ties... with no larger dwelling, no finer clothing, no other fare, with 
nothing different beyond these gifts...then you will look at us, not as 
gentlemen, as now, not as your superiors in worldly station, but still, 
nay, more strikingly so than now, still as messengers*54. 
Aside from criticizing the privileged status enjoyed by the clergy 
under the Established Church, this passage also insinuates that the loss 
of this status as a consequence of disestablishment will be a positive 
gain for the spiritual life of the Anglican Church. As Dr. Jose Morales 
has pointed out, the Oxford Movement was, as its name aptly indicates, 
a dynamic enterprise moving towards the attainment of a specific goal 
and an inseparable aspect of that goal is the separation of Church and 
State55. 
In 1841, Newman wrote Tract 90 proposing an interpretation of the 
Thirty-Nine Articles of the Anglican Creed consistent with a Catholic 
concept of the Church. Commenting on the thirty-seventh article, New-
man wrote that the alliance between Church and State was... «altogether 
53. Cfr. Diff. I, pp. 102-103. 
54. J. GRIFFIN, The Oxford Movement: A Revision, Edinburgh 1984, p. 26. 
55. J. MORALES, Semblanza Religiosa y Significado Teológico del Movimiento de Oxford, 
in «Scripta Theologica» 18 (1986) p. 502. 
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an ecclesiastical arrangement; not a point de fide, but of expedience, 
custom or piety, which cannot be claimed as if the Pope ought to have it, 
any more than, on the other hand, the King could claim it of Divine 
Right»56. 
It elicited such a clamour of protests from the Anglican clergy toge-
ther with accusations hurled at its author for being a crypto-Catholic. 
Newman did not expect such strong reaction especially from the clergy 
but he became convinced that the Anglican Church was hopelessly 
Erastian and its ethos Protestant. As he himself acknowledged later, this 
episode hastened the process of his conversion to Catholicism. He first 
resigned his vicarage at St. Mary's in Oxford and then retired to 
Littlemore where four years after he would be received into the Catholic 
Church. 
The above-mentioned commentary on the thirty-seventh article indi-
cates that Newman's views on Church-State separation were beginning 
to mature and to acquire the consistency of a doctrinal principle. By 
affirming that Church-State union is not a doctrine defide, Newman was 
laying an important doctrinal foundation for a further development of 
his doctrine on Church-State relations. For if the union of Church and 
State is dictated by expedience, then it is possible that historical 
circumstances may make it impossible and even undesirable. As his 
correspondence with Gladstone shows, by 1844 he had explicitly 
rejected his earlier belief in the duty of the State to uphold the Church57. 
In Newman's correspondence with Thomas Allies in the year 1860, 
he began to question the advantages and benefits that could be gained 
through the union of Church and State as institutionalized during the 
middle ages. His thesis was the following: assuming that the revealed 
object of the institution of the Church is to save souls, he thinks that 
there is no probability in facts (i.e. no evidence) that one organization of 
society saves more souls than another. He was willing to concede that in 
its abstract idea, a Christian monarchy is an immense gain towards the 
saving of souls but he emphatically denies it in fact and in the concrete. 
56. Cited in J. GRIFFIN, The Oxford Movement..., cit., p. 27. 
57. Cfr. J. D. HOLMES, Factors..., cit., p. 63; D. C. LATHBURY, Correspondence on 
Church and Religion of William Ewart Gladstone, I, London 1910, pp. 69-70. 
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«1 grant that State protection, patronage, sanction, is such (an 
immense gain towards the saving of souls), i.e. in its abstract 
idea, but is State patronage always so in fact, and in concrete? I 
say, no, because in fact patronage always has been, always will 
be, something besides patronage, in mundo maligno ; it will be 
interference. When the State gives, it will always take. The Quid 
pro quo in Christian legislation is Imperial Prerogative. Constan-
tine built churches, and delivered his opinion about orthodoxy 
and heresy. He honored bishops, but he introduced himself, and 
preached to them, in their Ecumenical Assembly, and called 
himself a bishop for external matters. We must consider, then, 
what State patronage in the concrete connotes; viz. State influen 
ce in holy things. It is a beneficial thing for bishops to be princes, 
as we learn from the history of the Middle Ages. I am not 
speaking against ecclesiastical establishments; I am but asking 
whether there is proof that the Church saves more souls when 
established, than when persecuted, or than when tolerated*58. 
St. John's dictum Mundus totus in maligno positus est left a deep 
impression on Newman's Weltanschauung. He saw it as an enduring fact 
—a permanent affliction of human society— which the Church will 
have to grapple with during its earthly pilgrimage. Since the world or 
human society in maligno positus est, all political organizations no 
matter how good they may be in theory or in the abstract «are so 
intimately bound up ab initio with their own corruptions, that they are 
likely not to be good in fact, and that they need not work well in the 
concrete*59. 
Thus, Newman concludes that no system of political organization is 
essentially beneficial to the Church's mission of saving souls but that 
one system may be accidentally better suited than another depending on 
the social and historical circumstances. Therefore, he contends «that the 
medieval political system, whatever good provisions it might enforce, 
still, as being only accidentally better fitted than another system for 
58. M. ALLIES, Thomas William Allies, London 1907, p. 123. 
59. Ibid., p. 120. Cfr. J. L. ILLANES, El Cristiano en el Mundo (Análisis del Vocabulario 
en los Sermones de John Henry Newman), in «Scripta Theologica» 19 (1987) pp. 563-595. 
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saving souls, is not, in the Divine Purpose, included in that object*60. In 
other words, Christianity is not tied up with any particular form of 
political organization and Newman was of the opinion that a system of 
Church-State separation in certain states of society, may turn out to be 
more beneficial to the Church's mission than their union. «May not I 
prefer, at this day, for the saving of souls, a Gallio for my ruler to a 
Philip II, a Gamaliel to a St. Louis?*61. 
IV. CONFESSIONALISM 
1. Religious toleration 
After his conversion, the problem of the reformation and indepen-
dence of the Anglican Church naturally ceased to be among his con-
cerns. As a member of a minority religion Newman's attention will be 
drawn towards other aspects of Church-State relations which will enable 
him to develop his thoughts on the question of tolerance, religious 
pluralism, religious liberty, and confessionalism. 
Even as an Anglican, Newman had already understood the necessity 
of the spirit of tolerance being widely extended in practice in modern 
society. He acted according to this conviction when he signed the peti-
tion in favor of the emancipation of Catholics even though he would 
later campaign against Peel's reelection precisely for supporting the 
emancipation bill in Parliament. Perhaps this inconsistency could be 
explained by his change of perspective regarding the issue. He was in 
favor of emancipation because he supported the spirit of tolerance but he 
rejected the passage of the bill because he thought it was passed as a 
political measure designed to pacify the Irish catholics and that it ma-
nifested the religious indifference of the Parliament which is supposed 
to support the Establishment Church. 
In the development of Newman's doctrine regarding toleration and 
confessionalism, there is an important change of perspective which we 
should not fail to appreciate. For instance, speaking of tolerance after his 
60. M. ALLIES, Thomas..., cit., p. 120. 
61. Ibid., p. 123. 
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conversion, he stated «1 do not undervalue at all the advantage of 
institutions which, though not Catholic, keep out evils worse than 
themselves... It is a plain duty, then, not to be forward in destroying 
religious institutions, even though not Catholic, if we cannot replace 
them with what is better; but from fear of injuring them, to shrink from 
saving the souls of individuals who live under them, would be worldly 
wisdom, treachery to Christ, and uncharitableness to His redeemed*62. 
Here Newman was simply following the Church's magisterium which 
has consistently taught that other religions could be tolerated in order to 
avoid greater evils. However, in a spirit of sound ecumenism, he also 
points out the practical benefits of such toleration63. 
Little is known about Newman's more concrete views regarding the 
issue of toleration during his anglican years. But a few months before 
his reception into the Catholic Church, there is an interesting correspon-
dence between him and Gladstone, who was then the Prime Minister, 
which brings to light the state of his mind with respect to this question. 
Gladstone was an evangelical by conviction, training, and habit who 
once held that the State has a conscience. It is capable of distinguishing 
between truth and error in religion and as a consequence it is bound to 
give official and financial support to the true religion and to none other. 
Newman challenged this doctrine in a letter he wrote to Gladstone 
saying: «Mr. Gladstone has said the State ought to have a conscience 
—but it has not a conscience. Can he give it a conscience? Is he to 
impose his own conscience on the State? He would be very glad to do 
so, if it thereby would become the State's conscience. But that is absurd. 
He must deal with facts. It has a thousand consciences, as being, in its 
legislative and executive capacities, the aggregate of a hundred minds 
—that is, it has no conscience*64. Gladstone had apparently arrived at 
the same conclusion even before receiving Newman's letter and in his 
reply to Newman he admitted that he can ho longer say that the State has 
62. Diff, I, p. 29. 
63. Cfr. Charles S. DESSAIN, The Biblical Basis of Newman's Ecumenical Theology, in J. 
COULSON-A. M. ALLCHIN (eds.). The Rediscovery of Newman: An Oxford Symposium, London 
1967, pp. 100-122. 
64. D.C. LATHBURY, Correspondence .... cit., pp. 69-70. 
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a conscience65. This brief correspondence reveals an incipient but highly 
significant idea in Newman's mind which he would develop later into his 
concept of the religiously neutral State. 
2. Religious freedom 
Newman's high regard for individual freedom would soon make him 
view the problem from a different perspective. In the series of lectures 
he delivered at the Birmingham Oratory responding to the public outcry 
against the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in England in 1850, he 
spoke of tolerance as a right which is common to all men «... they wish 
us to be grateful for a privilege which is our birthright as much as it is 
theirs... we are on a social equality with themselves, and that what is 
allowable in them is allowable in us...that we should have an opinion, 
that we should take a line of our own, that we should dare to convince 
people, that we should be offensive...*66. 
Newman does not employ the term religious liberty but this 
statement is a clear vindication of this fundamental human right. If the 
problem of religious pluralism is viewed from the standpoint of Truth, 
the logical solution is tolerance; viewed from the standpoint of human 
rights, the question of truth or error becomes irrelevant and the solution 
—the recognition of the right to religious liberty based on the dignity of 
the human person— is a political measure which does not imply any 
compromise with indifferentism towards religious truths. 
Until Newman's time and in fact until the Second Vatican Council, 
the Church had always looked at the problem of pluralism from the 
65. Gladstone's reply includes an interesting assessment of the Church-State relations in 
England at that time. He said «The State cannot be said now to have a conscience, at least not by 
me, inasmuch as I think it acts, and acts wilfully, and intends to go on acting, in such a way as no 
conscience —that is, no personal conscience (which is the only real form of one)— can endure. 
But the State still continues to act in many ways as if it had a conscience. The Christian figure of 
our institutions still remains, though marred by the most incongruous associations. There are, 
therefore, actual relations of the State to Religion —I mean to determinate religion— which still 
subsist and retain much vitality, and offer opportunities of good in proportion to it, however 
they may be surrounded with violent moral contradictions. For the sake of these opportunities I 
think that public life is tolerable, and in my case, as it at present stands, obligatory. But it is like 
serving for Leah afterwards to win Rachel». Cfr. D.C. LATHBURY, Correspondence..., cit., pp. 
71-74. 
66. Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England, London 1913, p. 199. 
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former viewpoint but Newman also considered it from the other 
perspective and in changing the focal point of the issue from Truth to 
human rights he was able to offer an alternative solution which would 
prove to be more suited to modern times. 
The idea of religious liberty as a fundamental human right which is 
what Newman was referring to in the statement quoted above was not 
yet current during Newman's time. The Liberals were certainly not 
referring to this when they proclaimed the liberty of conscience, which 
being based on religious indifferentism, is irreconcilable with the 
Christian faith and have therefore rightfully merited the outright and 
consistent condemnation of the Church. The terms employed by 
Newman —birthright and social equality— clearly evoke the idea of a 
civil right with respect to other men. It is what the Conciliar Declaration 
Dignitatis Humanae also recognized as a fundamental right of all men. 
In modern terminology, it is what is known as the liberty of consciences. 
It may serve to drive home this point by quoting what Newman 
considers as the erroneous idea of conscience which had become 
widespread in his age: 
«Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, 
with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom 
of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver 
and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a 
license to take up any or no religion, to take up this or that and let 
it go again, to go to Church, to go to chapel, to boast of being 
above all religions and to be an impartial critic of each of them. 
Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been 
superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to 
it never heard of, and could not have mistaken for it, if they had. 
It is the right of self-will»67. 
A detailed discussion of the subject of religious liberty as a 
fundamental human right cannot be found in Newman's published works 
and it is almost certain that he did not write directly about this topic. 
Perhaps one reason could be in order to avoid being misinterpreted and 
67. Diff, II, p. 250. Cfr. J. MORALES, Una Vision Cristiana de la Conciencia, in «Derecho 
y Persona* 5 (1978) pp. 539-560; J. FlNNIS, Conscience in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, in I. 
KER-A.G. HILL (eds.), Newman After a Hundred Years, Oxford 1990, pp. 401-418. 
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confused with the liberals who were also claiming religious liberty but 
in the wrong sense just enunciated. In any case, the idea of religious 
freedom is an implicit assumption in his thoughts about another subject 
which have already been alluded to in the course of this work: the State 
without a conscience or the religiously neutral State which in modern 
parlance is the equivalent of the laicist State. 
3. Religious neutrality of the State 
We have seen how Newman finally became convinced that in his 
time (and a fortiori in the future), the union of Church and State or what 
is now known as confessionalism was not the suitable type of relatio-
nship between the two institutions for the simple reason that it goes 
against the fact of social and ideological pluralism. «During the last 
seventy years», Newman observed, «first one class of community, then 
another, has awakened up to thought and opinion. Their multifarious 
views on sacred subjects necessarily affected and found expression in 
the governing order... the State ought to have a conscience; but what if it 
happened to have half-a-dozen, or a score, or a hundred, in religious 
matters, each different from each?... No government could be formed, if 
religious unanimity was a sine qua non»6S. 
Although Newman had maintained the position that the medieval 
system of Church-State union would not necessarily save more souls 
than another system of political organization, he admitted that it was a 
tested system and had been beneficial to the Church's mission inspite of 
its accompanying corruption. Perhaps this explains his seeming reluctan-
ce to give up the system and his yearning for religious unity which at the 
same time he knew was a chimerical wish. He expressed this wish in a 
letter saying «1 should call myself an anti-liberal, because, in harmony 
with the Pope's Syllabus, I should say that the best thing of all is to have 
a unity of religion in a country and that so real that its ascendancy is but 
the expression of the universal mind»69. 
On the other hand, the consequences of the religious neutrality of 
the State were unknown even though he was quite certain that it was 
68. Diff, n, pp. 267-268. 
69. Letters and Diaries, XXIV, pp. 191-192. 
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what the times demanded. Again, his empirical attitude to Church-State 
issues was what would lead him to the acceptance of the system of 
Church-State separation resigning himself to the fact that the State can 
no longer be identified with the religious profession of the people since 
there is no religious unity70. 
As he told Gladstone «When I was young the State had a cons-
cience, and the Chief Justice of the day pronounced, not as a point of 
obsolete law, but as an energetic, living truth, that Christianity was the 
law of the land... Though I profess to be an admirer of the principles 
now superseded in themselves, mixed up as they were with the imper-
fections and evils incident to everything human, nevertheless I say 
frankly I do not see how they could possibly be maintained in the 
ascendant*71. 
In keeping with his theory of the development of doctrine, he adds 
«there may be found out some way of uniting what is free in the new 
structure of society with what is authoritative in the old, without any 
base compromise with Progress and Liberalism*12. The fruit of this 
search will be the idea of the religious neutrality of the State advanced 
by Newman a century before the Church would sanction it in the Conci-
liar Declaration Dignitatis Humanae. 
The concept of the religious neutrality of the State is another of 
Newman's seminal ideas which he did not develop fully. Thus, it can 
hardly be considered a theory. Nevertheless, at this point, enough has 
been explained about Newman's thoughts relevant to the subject in order 
to be able to come up with a fair account of what this concept meant in 
Newman's mind. 
In the first place, the religiously neutral State means a State without 
a conscience in the sense understood from Newman's correspondence 
with Gladstone cited earlier. Not to have a conscience means that the 
State is incapable of making any judgment regarding truth and error in 
religious matters. In short, the State is incompetent in religious matters 
which is the current definition of a laicist State. 
70. Cfr. E. N O R M A N Newman's Social and Political Thinking, in I . K E R - A . G . H I L L (eds.), 
Newman After..., c i t .pp. 166-168. 
71. Diff, B.,p. 264. 
72. Ibid., pp. 264-268. 
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The immediate consequence of this incompetence in religious 
matters is that the State cannot profess any religion in particular —it 
cannot be a confessional State. Therefore, neither can it be obliged to 
officially support a particular religion in the sense of being the official 
secular arm of that religion enforcing religious obligations among the 
people. In principle, Newman had never been in favor of using force to 
impose a particular religion on the people because «The age is such, that 
we must go by reason, not by force... There is so much corruption, so 
much deadness, so much hipocrisy, so much infidelity, when a dogmatic 
faith is imposed on a nation by law, that I like freedom better...*73. In 
any case, any cooperation the State might offer to the Church must not 
be based on its being recognized as the true religion. 
With respect to the citizens, the State should regard the religious 
phenomenon as one more aspect of social life —a mainfestation of the 
religious liberty which every citizen enjoys as a fundamental right. 
Religious pluralism would have to be treated according to the principles 
of social equality among citizens. Therefore, there should be no 
discrimination of any sort —social, professional, educational, etc.— on 
account of one's religious creed. 
Newman was an avowed enemy of liberalism and as he said he 
wanted a solution «without any base compromise with Progress and 
Liberalism.* Thus his idea of religious neutrality cannot be based on 
religious indifferentism of the State which he firmly detested. A State 
without a conscience does not necessarily imply —certainly not in 
Newman's thoughts at least— indifference or a negative attitude towards 
religion. Let it be recalled here some of Newman's ideas about the nature 
of the State and its functions discussed earlier. 
Newman does not have any divine interpretations of the State. It is 
for him a purely natural phenomenon. Even though its existence is a 
divine ordinance, it is still a creation of man, brought to existence 
through the consent of the individuals who form it. Now the function of 
the State is to serve the interests of the citizens and this can be best 
fulfilled by protecting and promoting the exercise of individual rights 
with the minimum of State intervention. «The more a ruler meddles, the 
73. Letters and Diaries, XX, p. 477. 
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less he succeeds; the less he initiates, the more he accomplishes; his duty 
is that of overseeing, facilitating, encouraging, guiding, interposing on 
emergencies*74. The religiously neutral State, therefore, should apply 
these same principles with respect to the exercise of religious liberty. 
Newman's individualism is also an important feature of his Church-
State doctrine. The human person, not the civil authority is the 
protagonist of the society75. The whole social process has the individual 
as its foundation, bearer and end. Thus the main task of civil authority is 
to promote the dignity of the human person by guaranteeing the 
protection and promotion of his fundamental rights. Among these funda-
mental rights is of course the right to profess and practise one's own 
religion or what is presently known as religious liberty. 
In changing the terms of the issue to religious liberty of the indi-
vidual before the State, Newman was able to achieve an important 
development in the problem of Church-State relations in the modern 
world combining fidelity to tradition —what is authoritative in the 
old— and flexibility to adapt the exigencies of the modern conditions 
—without any base compromise with Liberalism or Progress. 
He avoids confusion between the spiritual and the temporal order 
since in guaranteeing religious liberty the State is not called to make any 
judgment concerning religious truths. The State must rather deal with 
the problem in secular terms such as justice and the common good, his 
main task being not to hinder the exercise of religious liberty. There is 
no doubt that if the religiously neutral State acted in this way, the 
freedom and independence of the Church will also be enhanced. As the 
Conciliar Declaration Dignitatis Humanae affirmed «When the principle 
of religious freedom is not just proclaimed in words or incorporated in 
law but is implemented sincerely in practice, only then does the Church 
enjoy in law and in fact those stable conditions which give her the 
independence necessary for fulfilling her divine mission... A harmony 
exists therefore between the freedom of the Church and that religious 
74. Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects, p. 336. 
75. Cfr. T. KENNY, The Political Thought of John Henry Newman, London 1957, pp. 20-
21, 76-79, 188-190. Newman's strong underlying individualism made impossible any sort of 
worship of the State, which he considered was of a limited and functional character. 
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freedom which must be recognized as the right of all men and all 
communities and must be sanctioned by constitutional law»7 6. 
Newman does not completely discard the possibility that a State 
would choose to establish Catholicism. But he makes clear that the more 
important thing is not the formal establishment of Catholicism but the 
reception of Catholic ideals and principles in its institutions. Catho-
licism does not depend on its establishment for its existence, nor does its 
tradition live upon its establishment; it can do without establishment, 
and often dispenses with it to an advantage. A Catholic nation, as a 
matter of course, establishes Catholicism because it is a Catholic nation; 
but in such a case, Catholicism and its tradition come first, and esta-
blishment comes second...It is but the accident of a particular state of 
things, the result of the fervour of the people; it is the will of the masses; 
but, I repeat, it is not necessary for Catholicism*77. 
Newman's attitude towards the Parliamentary debate over the Affir-
mation Bill in 1883 could illustrate the firmness which he has acquired 
in this conviction. When Malcolm Maccoll, an advocate of the Bill 
wrote him to ask his opinion about the issue, he replied: 
«You will think my want of interest to be strange; but I think it 
implies that in the main I agree with you. At least two years ago, 
when the question of protesting against abolishing the Parliamen-
tary recognition of Almighty God came before me, I felt that 
since Christianity had ceased to be the religion of Parliament for 
many years, the God of the Christians was no longer the God of 
Parliament, and I did not see what was gained by acknowledging 
any God but Him who in Scripture and the Creed is defined to be 
the Maker of heaven and earth and Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ. I had other reasons for being indisposed to protest but this 
I believe was the main one»7 8. 
76. Dignitatis Humanae, no. 13. (This and other texts from conciliar documents are taken 
from their english translation in: A. FLANNERY (ed.), Documents of Vatican II, Michigan 1984.) 
77. Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England, pp. 55-56. 
78. Letters and Diaries, XXX, p. 205. The old Parliamentary oath used to be: On the true 
faith of a Christian, so help me God. On the true faith of a Christian was struck out of the oath 
for the express purpose of admitting into Parliament men who were not Christians. So that the 
oath became merely a vague profession of a theism, of which all that can be said was that it was 
not Christian. The Government was proposing, in the Affirmation Bill, to give fresh members 
the option of not taking the oath. The Conservatives proposed simply to negative the Bill. 
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Thus, Newman had advanced a theory of Church-State relations 
which can be considered liberal but at the same time faithful to the 
essential elements of tradition. It is liberal in the sense that it is compa-
tible with the liberal notion of a pluralist society in a religiously neutral 
state. But it is faithful to traditional doctrine precisely because it evades 
the doctrinal question by keeping the problem within the realm of poli-
tics while at the same time assures the Church of the freedom to carry 
out her mission. 
V . LIBERALISM 
The study of Newman's thoughts on Church and State will not be 
complete without an examination of his fundamental attitude towards 
Liberalism19. In his well-known Biglietto speech, Newman solemnly 
renewed his protest against the spirit of liberalism in religion which he 
claimed to have been his lifelong enemy. It is true that as an Anglican he 
spent twelve years at the head of the Oxford Movement fighting against 
Erastianism - the doctrine which denies the Church of self-government 
and its rightful jurisdiction over its members attributing both functions 
to the State. The Church is thus reduced to just another department of 
the State's operations completely subservient to the latter's interests. 
Now the connection between Erastianism and liberalism can easily 
be shown. Under the Erastian system of Church-State relations it is 
inevitable that when the government happens to espouse liberal convic-
tions, the principles of liberalism would affect the Church. Erastianism 
and liberalism, therefore, constitute a lethal combination guaranteed to 
destroy the very life of the Church. And this was precisely what 
Newman saw taking place before his eyes when the Whigs —the very 
incarnation of liberalism— rose to power in the English Parliament. The 
Tractarian Movement was his attempt to provide a solution to the pro-
blem of how to keep the Church from being liberalized. 
Writing in the Apologia he affirmed that the principle of dogma 
being the first fundamental tenet of the Oxford Movement, his battle 
79. Cfr. J.D. HOLMES More Roman than Rome: English Catholicism in the Nineteenth 
Century (Newman and the Failure of Liberal Catholicism), London 1978, pp. 111-149. 
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was with liberalism, by which he meant the antidogmatic principle and 
its development. Since the age of fifteen, Newman had understood and 
had firmly upheld the fundamental importance of dogma in religion. «1 
know no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of 
religion; religion as a mere sentiment, is to me a dream and a 
mockery*80. 
Before going on to examine his attitude, it would be good to clarify 
what Newman understood by the term Liberalism. In the appendix 
Liberalism in the Apologia of 1865, Newman explained that liberalism 
denotes a claim to a false liberty of thought which leads to the «mistake 
of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in 
their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine 
on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for 
their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word»8 1. 
In this sense, liberalism in religion would appear almost identical to 
Rationalism which Newman defines as a certain abuse of Reason using 
it «for purposes for which it was never intended, and is unfitted. To 
rationalize in matters of Revelation is to make our reason the standard 
and measure of the doctrines revealed*82. 
Now Newman's concept of liberalism in religion is not simply 
synonymous to rationalism. In a letter to Armstrong written on March 
23, 1887, Newman explains that liberalism is the development of 
rationalism. «It views faith as a mere natural gift, the like and conse-
quence of reason —the moral sense; and by reason and the moral sense 
(the rationalist) estimates it and measures its objects. He soon comes to 
be satisfied with other men though they ignore faith and its objects, 
provided they recognize reason and the moral sense. This is libera-
lism*83. 
Liberalism in religion gives rise to various consequences which 
Newman enumerates in the Biglietto speech. «Liberalism in religion is 
80. Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 54. 
81. Ibid., p. 256. 
82. Letters and Diaries, XXXI, pp. 197-198. Cfr. C. GUNTON, Newman's Dialectic: 
Dogma and Reason in the Seventy-third Tract for the Times, in I. KER-A.G. HILL (eds.), 
Newman After..., cit:, pp. 309-322. 
83. Letters and Diaries, XXXI, pp. 197-198. Cfr. E. NORMAN, Newman's Social and 
Political Thinking, in I. KER-A.G. HlLL (eds.), Newman After..., cit., pp. 153-166. 
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the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed 
is as good as another, and this is the teaching which is gaining substance 
and force daily. It is inconsistent with any recognition of any religion as 
true. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of opinion. 
Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an 
objective fact, not miraculous; and it is the right of each individual to 
make it say just what strikes his fancy. Devotion is not necessarily 
founded on faith. Men may go to Protestant Churches and to Catholic, 
may get good from both and belong to neither. They may fraternise 
together in spiritual thoughts and feelings, without having any views at 
all of doctrines in common, or seeing the need of them». 
But it does not end there since it also necessarily brings about 
certain socio-political consequences. «Since, then, religion is so personal 
a peculiarity and so private a possession, we must of necessity ignore it 
in the intercourse of man with man. If a man puts on a new religion 
every morning, what is that to you? It is as impertinent to think about a 
man's religion as about his sources of income or his management of his 
family. Religion is in no sense the bond of society*84. 
Before going further, it would be good to examine closely the roots 
of Newman's opposition to liberalism. Terence Kenny traces the roots of 
this opposition to Newman's pessimism about man and his capabilities 
after the Fall. «This imbecile optimism about man which Newman 
thought to be ever more characteristic of his age underlay the whole 
general notion of liberalism for Newman, and he attacked it throughout 
his life. But with this as basis, it is clear that liberalism can neither be an 
exclusively religious nor political idea. The optimism is judged to be 
absurd from the standpoint of the religious doctrine of the Fall, but the 
fact that men ignore the Fall has important political implications*85. At 
the root of the plea for rights and liberty, Newman saw the assertion of a 
free will which refuses to be bound by anything outside itself which he 
considered utterly false and unrealistic. «Behind Newman's argument 
can be seen the belief that liberty is captive by truth, that true liberty 
presupposes laws with which it must be in accordance - an idea with a 
84. M K. STROLZ, Commemmorative Essays..., pp. 99-105. 
85. T. KENNY, The Political Thought..., cit., p. 129. Cfr. H.A. MACDOUGALL, The Acton-
Newman Relations: The Dilemma of Christian Liberalism, New York 1962. 
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long history, and much to commend it, although Newman does not 
attempt to develop it*86. 
How did Newman's antiliberalism in religious matters affect his 
political thinking? The answer to this question will show that although 
there can be no doubt that he was absolutely opposed to liberalism in 
religion, he was not so with respect to liberalism in politics. Newman 
certainly did not attack political liberalism of every and any sort8 7. For 
instance, he could be labeled a liberal himself in his concurrence with 
the particular doctrine about the limits of State action and the role of 
individual freedoms. 
Indeed it can be said that Newman only attacked political liberalism 
when it entered the sphere of religion. He explicitly said so in his 
Biglietto speech «... it must be borne in mind, that there is much in 
liberalistic theory which is good and true; for example, not to say more, 
the precepts of justice, truthfulness, sobriety, self-command, benevo-
lence, which, as I have already noted, are among its avowed principles, 
and the natural laws of society. It is not till we find that this array of 
principles is intended to supersede, to block out, religion, that we 
pronounce it to be evil». 
In particular, Newman could not wholly accept the liberal doctrine 
that Religion is in no sense the bond of society. For Newman, it seems, 
there are two ways in which religion serves as a social bond8 8. Firstly, 
where religion is a common possession of the people of a State, it could 
be a state-supported legal establishment. Secondly, religion provided a 
social bond in the moral sense teaching «to rule with sweetness and 
obey with dignity* and preventing the naked struggle between the indi-
vidual and the political authority. 
In this way religion eases the tension between authority and the 
individual by making a virtue of the individual's free acceptance of just 
authority, and by making authority more than mere arbitrary power, 
subjecting it in the last resort to a higher power than itself. In this way, a 
harmonious relationship is established between the political authority 
86. T. KENNY, 77ie Political Thought..., cit., p. 131. 
87. Cfir. M. O'CONNELL, Newman and Liberalism, in S . JAKI (ed.), Newman Today, pp. 
79-81. 
88. Cfr. T. KENNY, The Political Thought..., cit., p. 135. 
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and the individual for voluntary obedience to authority is regarded as a 
virtue and the authority is neither arbitrary nor absolute but is exercised 
based on the principles of justice and ultimately subject to a higher 
power than itself. 
Newman did not oppose the liberal rejection of religion as a social 
bond in the first sense. He was quite realistic enough to accept that in the 
modern society, religion —whether regrettably or not— was in fact no 
longer the common possession of the State nor was it likely to be so in 
the foreseeable future. He saw a rationalization of this phenomenon in 
his theory of development of the State from barbarism to civilization. 
For Newman, it seemed, that «certain ages, i.e. the age of barbarism are 
more susceptible of religious impressions than other ages; and call for, 
need, the visible rule of Religion, that as every animal knows its wants, 
and distinguishes by instinct between food and poison, so a ruder people 
asks for a strong force of religion, armed with temporal sanctions; and 
its is good for it; whereas other ages reject it, and it would be bad for 
them»89. 
Thus, «a medieval system now would but foster the worst hypocrisy 
- not because this age is worse than that, but because imagination acts 
more powerfully upon barbarians, and reason on traders, savants, and 
newspaper readers*90. He concludes «1 do not see my way to hold that 
Catholic civilization, as you describe it, is in fact (I do not say in the 
abstract), but in fact, has been, or shall be, or can be, a good, or per se 
desirable*91. 
This last statement should be interpreted in the light of Newman's 
views about the State particularly his idea that the civilized State in its 
perfect idea is the Christian State. Newman would admit that in theory 
but his experience of Erastianism and his realistic view of the tendencies 
of fallen human nature tells him that in fact, such has never been the 
case nor could it be attainable in the future. Thus he came to prefer the 
liberal ideal of a mediocre, religiously neutral State. 
8 9 . M. ALLIES, Thomas..., cit., pp. 1 1 3 - 1 1 4 . Cfr. T . KENNY, The Political Thought..., cit., 
pp. 9 0 - 9 1 . 
9 0 . Ibid. 
9 1 . Ibid. p. 1 1 1 . T.W. Allies described Catholic civilization as «the ideal which the 
Church aimed at in the Middle Ages, and which she worked into the laws, manners, institutions, 
public policy, or public opinion of Europe». 
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But the religious neutrality of the State does not imply that religion 
or Christianity can be relegated to oblivion or restricted to the private 
life of individuals. In the Biglietto speech, Newman described how the 
Christian framework of society was being thrown off from society. 
«Hitherto, it has been considered that religion alone, with its 
supernatural sanctions, was strong enough to secure submission 
of the masses of our population to law and order; now the Philo-
sophers and Politicians are bent on satisfying this problem 
without the aid of Christianity. Instead of the Church's authority 
and teaching, they would substitute, first of all a universal and 
thoroughly secular education, calculated to bring home to every 
individual that to be orderly, industrious, and sober is his perso-
nal interest. Then for great working principles to take the place of 
religion, for the use of the masses thus carefully educated, it 
provides - the broad fundamental ethical truths, of justice, bene-
volence, veracity, and the like; proved experience; and those 
natural laws which exist and act spontaneously in society, and in 
social matters, whether physical or psychological; for instance, in 
government, trade, finance, sanitary experiments, and the inter-
course of nations. As to Religion, it is a private luxury, which a 
man may have if he will; but which of course he must pay for, 
and which he must not obtrude upon others, or indulge in to their 
annoyance*. 
The appendix on liberalism which was cited previously contains an 
interesting remark which could illuminate Newman's ideas discussed 
above. In the list of liberal propositions which he had earnestly denoun-
ced and abjured while at Oxford, he said that he «gave in to none of 
them except number 12 and perhaps number 11»92. Among the proposi-
tions he rejected two can be singled out as especially directed to replace 
religion as a social bond namely the thirteenth: Utility and expedience 
are the measure of political duty and eighteenth: Virtue is the child of 
knowledge and vice of ignorance. 
92. Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 257. Proposition no. 11 reads: There is no such thing as a 
national or state conscience and the twelfth proposition reads: The civil power has no positive 
duty, in a normal state of things, to maintain religious truth. 
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Newman recognized a tendency for liberalism to go beyond an 
attack on any form of political institutionalizing of religion, to a general 
attack on the social manifestation of religion in any form. Thus, «the 
effect of the liberal party all throughout Europe is to put down a clerical 
order as such»9 3. The latter is what Newman fought against all throu-
ghout his life. 
Newman did not fear that the separation between Church and State 
would be inimical to the Church's salvific mission but he was thoroughly 
convinced that when Religion altogether disappears from the life of 
society, many souls will be lost. Thus a religiously neutral state for 
Newman cannot do away with moral principles without in the long or 
short run producing damage to society. Broad ethical truths are not 
enough for without Christian morality it is going to waive aside true 
morality for the sake of expedience or utility or temporal benefits. 
VI. N E W M A N ' S C H U R C H - S T A T E D O C T R I N E A N D V A T I C A N II 
1. Doctrinal development in Vatican II 
The Second Vatican Council achieved a remarkable progress in the 
development of the doctrine on Church-State relations even though it 
cannot be claimed that the Church had abandoned the traditional tea-
chings of the Popes regarding the subject. As the Council Fathers 
asserted, the doctrine on religious freedom «leaves intact the traditional 
Catholic teaching on the moral duty of individuals and societies towards 
the true religion and the one Church of Christ»94. 
In fact, as John Courtney Murray says, the development of the 
doctrine consisted mainly in the transformation of the status questionis95. 
93. Letters and Diaries, XXVII, p. 145. «1 am distressed that Lord Coleridge should have 
spoken so outright against the sacerdotal principle... hat God has not in any sense appointed 
guardians of religion - whether in one visible Church, or by an Apostolical Succession, or by a 
priesthood, or by the voice of the congregation... Religion naturally wants a guardian, which 
temporal interests can much better do without, yet they have plenty...» 
94. Dignitatis Humanae, n. 1. Cfr. A. de FUENMAYOR, La Libertad Religiosa, (La Nocion 
Conciliar de Libertad Religiosa) Pamplona 1974, pp. 15-47. 
95. Cfr. J. COURTNEY MURRAY, 77ie Church-State Issue in Vatican II, in ^Theological 
Studies* 27 (1966) pp. 580-606; P. LoMBARDiA, El Derecho Publico Externo Segun el Vaticano 
II, in «Escritos de Derecho Can6nico», II, pp. 351-431. 
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In so doing, the Second Vatican Council did not deal directly with the 
issue of Church-State relations as such, limiting itself to the establish-
ment of certain guiding principles on which this relationship should be 
based. These principles can be gathered from the two conciliar docu-
ments in which this question comes up, namely the Declaration on 
Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae and the Pastoral Constitution 
on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes96. 
As stated earlier, the magisterium of Pope Leo XIII paved the way 
for this doctrinal development. Faced with the progressive laicization of 
society in Continental Europe, what concerned him most was the preser-
vation of the Christian order in society. Church-State relations was just a 
subordinate aspect of this wider goal. Thus he transformed the ancient 
issue of the dyarchy by including it within the broader problem of the 
role of the Church in human society. The new terms of the issue then 
became the Church both as a spiritual authority and also as the commu-
nity of the Christian faithful, and human society in the whole range of its 
institutional life - social, economic, and cultural, as well as political. 
The Second Vatican Council pursued this direction but with the 
even broader perspectives demanded by the signs of the times. While 
Leo XIII was chiefly addressing the problem of the Catholic Church in 
Europe, the Vatican Council II was contemplating the panorama of 
religion in general and human society throughout the world. Thus, it was 
able to effect a more radical transformation of the status questionis and 
opened the way to a more profound doctrinal development. 
Speaking before Newman scholars at the Conference on John Henry 
Cardinal Newman organized by the Wethersfield Institute in 1988, Ian 
Ker began his discourse saying «Newman has often been called the 
Father of the Second Vatican Council. And while it might be difficult or 
impossible to trace his direct influence on the actual Council documents, 
there is no doubt that Vatican II upheld and vindicated those contro-
versial positions that he espoused in his own time, and so often at his 
96. Cfr. C. SoLER, Iglesia y Estado, La Incidencia del Concilio Vaticano II Sobre el 
Derecho Publico Externo, Pamplona 1993. This book offers an excellent discussion of the 
legislative itinerary and interpretation of these documents from the standpoint of Public 
Ecclesiastical Law. 
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own personal cost*97. Perhaps, his words apply particularly to Newman's 
doctrine on Church-State relations. While it still remains to be shown 
whether Newman influenced the Council at all in the formulation of its 
doctrine on Church-State relations, the following discussion will try to 
demonstrate that the basic principles underlying the development of this 
doctrine in the Second Vatican Council are the very same principles on 
which Newman's Church-State doctrine is based98. 
2. «Dignitatis humanae» 
Firstly, the Declaration makes an explicit recognition of the 
universal human right to religious freedom which it defines as immunity 
«from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every 
human power so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against 
his convictions in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in 
association with others (n. 2)». This is clearly an acknowledgment of the 
fact of the religiously pluralist society as the necessary historical context 
for dealing with the question just as Newman had accepted in his time 
even though he hardly spoke of religious liberty in an explicit manner. 
Secondly, the political doctrine implicit in the Declaration also 
coincides with Newman's idea of government as constitutional and 
whose functions are limited to that of the protection and promotion of 
man's rights and facilitation of private enterprise. The Declaration owes 
this concept of the State to Pope Pius XH's personalist conception of 
society based on the premise that the «human person is the foundation, 
97. I. KER, Newman and the Postconciliar Church, in S. JAKI, (ed.), Newman Today, cit., 
p. 121. 
98. There are indications of explicit mention of Newman in some sessions of the council. 
For instance, in the second session, the Essay on Development was mentioned twice: by Cardinal 
Gracias of Bombay who thought it was the text whereby the Council should proceed and by the 
Rector of the Institut Catholique de Paris Bishop Blanchet, who deemed it still most useful after 
one hundred years. In the third, the Archbishop of Baltimore suggested that the Essay on 
Development be mentioned in the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et 
Spes). In the fourth session, Cardinal Heenan reminded the Fathers that we should toast 
conscience before we toast the pope. Cited in N. LASH, Newman Since Vatican II, in I. KER-
A.G. HILL (eds.), Newman After..., cit., p. 449. 
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the goal, and the bearer of the social process,* including the process of 
government". 
This personalist conception of society which Newman also held 
leads to the assertion of the preeminence of the dignity of the human 
person as a determining factor in social and political doctrine. Thus the 
human person, not religious truth, is the central piece around which the 
structure of Church-State relations is built. This is done without any 
doctrinal compromise since in placing the human person at the nucleus 
of the issue, the doctrinal question does not enter into the picture as the 
issue is transformed into the political question concerning the religious 
freedom of the individual person with respect to the civil authority. 
In effect, the liberty of consciences is deemed more important than 
religious truth as such. Thus, the Declaration states that if special 
recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional 
organization of a State, the right of all citizens and religious commu-
nities to religious freedom must be recognized and respected as well 
(Cfr. n. 6). Newman, who would toast conscience first before the Pope, 
would have rejoiced at this development. 
Thirdly, the Declaration also makes a disavowal of the long-
standing view of government as sacral in function, i.e., as invested with 
the functions of defending and promoting religious truth as such. The 
State would be exceeding the limits of its power if it presumed to control 
or restrict religious activity (Cfr. n. 3). It is, therefore, incompetent to 
judge religious truth which is essentially what Newman meant by a State 
without a conscience. The only function of government with regard to 
religion is the protection and promotion, not of religious truth, but of 
religious freedom as a fundamental human right. And this function, 
being secular or political in nature, is understood to fall completely 
within the sphere of competence of the civil authority. 
Furthermore, religious freedom of all citizens is regarded as an 
integral part of the common good which the civil authorities are 
enjoined to safeguard in an effective manner through just legislation and 
99. Cited by JOHN XXHI in Pacem in Terris, AAS 55 (1963) p. 263. 
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other appropriate means1 0 0. The State's role with respect to the religious 
phenomenon is not merely passive as it must help to create conditions 
favorable to the fostering of religious life so that the citizens will be 
really in a position to exercise their religious duties and so that society 
itself may enjoy the benefits of justice and peace which results from 
man's faithfulness to God and his holy will (Cfr. n. 6). We can find an 
echo of this in Newman's idea of the common possession of society and 
in his concern that religion be kept as a social bond since he believed 
that it was the only force really capable of making man morally good. 
Finally, he Declaration also stated that the freedom of the Church is 
the fundamental principle in Church-State relations. Her claim to this 
freedom is based on two titles: as a divine institution transcendent to the 
temporal order and as a religious community. The establishment of 
Catholicism as the religion of the State is not proposed as the ideal 
system making it plain that it is not a doctrine de fide but a result of 
historical circumstances. Moreover, it clearly states that confessionality 
should never be a detriment to the religious freedom of other religious 
communities nor lead to any form of discrimination on account of reli-
gious profession. As Newman had affirmed over a century before, the 
establishment of religion is not necessary for the Catholic Church to 
fulfill her mission and the only thing that is truly essential for the 
accomplishment of the Church's salvific mission is her independence 
and freedom. 
The Declaration can thus be considered as a clear vindication of 
Newman's prophetic statements regarding the impossibility of maintai-
ning the union of Church and State as the basis of relations between the 
two institutions. As Newman had asserted in his time, the Council has 
accepted that the religious pluralism which characterizes modern society 
demands that the State be without a conscience or religiously neutral. In 
other words, as the Council affirmed, religion itself, not the government, 
has the function of making society religious. The only conditions 
necessary to the fulfillment of this function are the conditions of 
freedom and independence which the State should foster and guarantee. 
100. Cfr. A . de FUENMAYOR, La Libertad Religiosa, (La Libertad Religiosa y el Bien 
Comun Temporal) cit., pp. 51-76; J.C.y MURRAY, The Problem of Religious Freedom, in 
«Theological Studies* 25 (1964) pp. 503-575. 
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3. «Gaudium et Spes» 
The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 
Gaudium et Spes reaffirms the traditional doctrine regarding the mission 
of the Church in the temporal order adapting it to the conditions 
obtaining in modern society. While Dignitatis Humanae talks about the 
actions of the State with respect to the Church and religion in general, 
Gaudium et Spes deals with the function of the Church in human society 
one aspect of which concerns the actions of the Church with respect to 
the State. As in Dignitatis Humanae, the aggiornamento achieved by 
Gaudium et Spes stems from its emphasis on the dignity of the human 
person and a more ecumenical attitude with respect to other religions. It 
lays stress on two important truths namely, the distinction between the 
Church and the World and the transcendence of the Church to the 
temporal order. To these two truths are linked the freedom and indepen-
dence which the Church claims from civil authority. 
The political community is discussed in the fourth chapter of Part 
Two and the Church-State problematic is confronted under the heading 
The Political Community and the Church (n. 76). It contains a categori-
cal assertion that the Church, by reason of her role and competence is 
not identified with any political community nor bound by ties to any 
political system. This is a direct consequence of the mutual indepen-
dence and autonomy of both institutions. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on the dignity of the human person and 
the recognition of human rights shows a discreet commitment to the 
establishment of a constitutional order in society. Only this system of 
government can provide the juridical protection that guarantees the 
freedom of man and of the Church. This is quite clear in the following 
statement: «The Church desires nothing more ardently than to develop 
itself untrammelled in the service of all men under any regime which 
recognizes the basic rights of the person and the family, and the needs of 
the common good» (n. 40). An identical position was held by Newman, 
who once affirmed that there is no evidence that one organization of 
society saves more souls than another but at the same time he was also 
convinced that Catholicism is safer and more free under a constitutional 
regime such as Britain's. 
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The mutual independence and the autonomy of the Church and the 
political community does not exclude the establishment of cooperation 
between them. This cooperation is not demanded on the basis of any title 
or right but is deemed necessary because of the dual nature of man who 
is «not confined to the temporal order; but living in the level of human 
history, he preserves the integrity of his eternal destiny*. The specific 
forms of cooperation between the Church and State are not discussed; it 
rather simply states that they should be carried out according to local 
and prevailing situation clearly suggesting that this cooperation is not 
dictated by doctrine but by historical circumstances. 
The teaching of Dignitatis Humanae on confessionality also finds 
an echo in the statement which says that the Church «never places its 
hopes in any privileges accorded to it by civil authority and is prepared 
to give up the exercise of certain legitimate rights whenever it becomes 
clear that their use will compromise the sincerity of its witness, or 
whenever new circumstances call for a revised approach*. It therefore 
reaffirms that these privileges are not essential for the Church to 
accomplish her mission and that the only thing that the Church needs is 
true freedom to carry out her task without hindrance from the civil 
power. 
On the freedom of the Church, the Constitution simply reiterates the 
principles found in Dignitatis Humanae laying emphasis on the right of 
the Church to intervene in political affairs. This intervention, however, 
can never be of a political character since it is limited to that of passing 
moral judgments «in matters relating to politics, whenever the funda-
mental rights of man or the salvation of souls requires it». Thus it has a 
clearly spiritual motive and, at the same time, its mode of intervention is 
also limited since «the only means it may use are those which are in 
accord with the Gospel and the welfare of men according to the diversity 
of times and circumstances*. 
Newman's teaching on the subject is of course completely in accord 
with the foregoing as he considered it a duty of clergymen by reason of 
their office to pass judgment on events of the day and public men. He 
agrees that clergymen should not meddle in politics only in the sense 
that «they should not aim at secular objects, should not side with a 
political party as such, should not be ambitious of popular applause, or 
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the favour of great men, should not take pleasure and lose time in 
business of this world, should not be covetous* 1 0 1. But this does not 
mean that they cannot express their opinion and exert an influence one 
way rather than another. 
Moreover, Newman insisted that this intervention has become 
necessary because of the imperfections wrought by Adam's fall on 
human nature which had so affected his intellect and will that it is 
practically impossible for him to always ascertain those truths which 
God has sown in his very nature and to tend to his supernatural end 
without the assistance of the Church's sacraments and teaching 
authority. 
«But the sense of right and wrong, which is the first element in 
religion, is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, 
perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible 
by education, so biassed by pride and passion, so unsteady in its 
course, that, in the struggle for existence amid the various 
exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at 
once the highest of all teachers, yet the least luminous; and the 
Church, the Pope, the Hierarchy are, in the Divine purpose, the 
supply of an urgent demand. Natural Religion, certain as are its 
grounds and its doctrines as addressed to thoughtful, serious 
minds, needs, in order that it may speak to mankind with effect 
and subdue the world, to be sustained and completed by Revela-
tion...In saying all this, of course I must not be supposed to be 
limiting the Revelation of which the Church is the keeper to a 
mere republication of the Natural Law; but still it is true, that, 
though Revelation is so distinct from the teaching of nature and 
beyond it, yet it is not independent of it, nor without relations 
towards it, but is its complement, reassertion, issue, embodiment, 
and interpretation*102. 
By now there should be no doubt that Newman's doctrine on 
Church-State relations can indeed be considered as an anticipation of 
101. Parochial and Plain Sermons, I, p. 158. 
102. Diff, U, p. 253-254. 
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what the Second Vatican Council has taught1 0 3. The remarkable agree-
ment between the two can be attributed mainly to their common 
perspectives of a religiously pluralistic society and the high regard for 
the individuality and dignity of the human person. 
Neither Newman nor the Second Vatican Council, however, goes 
beyond stating general principles or guidelines for the development of 
Church-State doctrine. The highest achievement of both, though with 
more than a century separating them, was the transformation of the 
Church-State problematic from a doctrinal to a political question toge-
ther with the development of the doctrine of the absolute incompetence 
of the State in religious matters. Newman expressed this in his concept 
of the religiously neutral State or the State without a conscience which 
implicitly includes the recognition of religious freedom with respect to 
civil authority. The Second Vatican Council confirmed this doctrine by 
teaching that the duty of the State is to protect and promote not religious 
truth but the religious liberty of individuals and communities, implicitly 
accepting the religious neutrality of the State. 
CONCLUSION 
The salient features of Newman's doctrine on Church-State can be 
briefly summarized as follows: 
1) The independence of the Church as a fundamental principle in its 
relations with the State. Newman insists not so much on the Church as a 
societas iuridice perfecta as on her being a mysterious creation of God. 
The independence of the Church is based primarily on her supernatural 
nature. The Church is a visible society but it is at the same time a divine 
institution with an exclusively supernatural mission to fulfill —the 
salvation of souls. 
103. Cfr. I. KER, Newman and the Postconciliar Church, cit., pp. 121-139. This author 
demonstrates that Newman had also anticipated other important conciliar documents such as 
Lumen Gentium, Dei Verbum, and Ad Gentes. See also B.C. BUTLER, O. S. B., Newman and the 
Second Vatican Council, in J. COULSON-A.M. ALLCHIN (eds.), The Rediscovery..., cit., pp. 235-
246. 
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2) The disavowal of any sacral function of the State. The State is a 
creation of man even though its existence is a divine ordinance. It is 
entrusted with the care of temporal society and its dominion does not 
extend beyond the temporal order. It does not have the duty to support 
or enforce any particular religion. The Church can live under any form 
of political organization.as long as her freedom is guaranteed. 
3) The autonomy of the temporal order. The Church does not have 
any jurisdiction in the temporal order although she has the obligation to 
intervene in temporal affairs when the salvation of souls —her exclusive 
concern— demands it. She does so, however, according to her spiritual 
nature and using the means proper to it. This intervention, therefore, can 
never be of a political character nor motivated by any interest other than 
the spiritual good of souls. The temporal power which the Church had 
wielded in the past is the result of historical circumstances and cannot be 
claimed just as civil authority cannot claim any jurisdiction in spiritual 
matters. To the laity belongs the task of exerting a Christian influence in 
society not only through their words and example but also in the pursuit 
of their specific calling to engage in secular activities which they should 
carry out for the glory of God. 
4) The religious neutrality of the State. The State has no conscience 
i.e. it is incompetent to judge religious truths. Hence, the State cannot 
enforce nor suppress any particular religion. Religious pluralism in 
society must therefore be respected. The State's duty is to promote and 
protect the religious liberty of its citizens, not religious truth as such. 
This function falls within the realm of secular affairs which belongs to 
the juridical competence of the State. 
As stated before, the concept of the religious neutrality of the State 
was a transformation of the Church-State problematic into a political 
question involving the religious liberty of individuals and groups before 
the State. The problems arising from the establishment of a confessional 
regimen in a pluralist society are thus superseded without touching the 
doctrinal issues involved. Newman based his concept on his conviction 
that the union of Church and State is a happy anomaly but not an 
exigency of a doctrine defide. 
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5) The primacy of human conscience and the dignity of the human 
person. The State and the Church exist for the service of man who is the 
protagonist in society. The cooperation between Church and State is 
demanded by the integral good of the human person since man cannot 
attain perfection without religion. The State's principal function is to 
promote and safeguard the temporal common good of society which 
consists primarily in the protection and promotion of individual rights. 
This is best achieved when the State limits its functions to those acti-
vities which cannot be carried out by private enterprise. Newman consi-
ders the constitutional form of government as the system which could 
best guarantee the rights of the citizens. 
6) Religion i.e. Christianity is an integral element of the common 
good of society. Newman had always opposed the liberalist tendency to 
restrict religion to the private life of individuals. But the role of the 
Church in the world cannot be understood completely except in the 
context of the mystery of redemption. Man has been called to a life of 
grace and he cannot attain this with ethics or natural religion alone. «The 
world is content with setting right the surface of things; the Church aims 
at regenerating the very depths of the heart» 1 0 4. Newman stressed the 
indispensable role of religion in the life of society and goes so far as to 
say that the it cannot disregard religion without eventually ruining itself. 
It is difficult to judge whether Newman's doctrine is more signifi-
cant for its anticipation of the teachings of the Second Vatican Council 
or for its contribution to the actual development of Church-State doctri-
ne. We think that they mutually reinforce each other. That Newman's 
doctrine on Church-State relations could actually contribute to the 
development of this doctrine today is all the more significant because he 
had thought it out more than a century before the Church ratified it with 
her teaching authority. 
As Newman had predicted, the regimen of confessionality has been 
superseded in practically all Christian nations and replaced by the 
principle of the incompetence of the State in religious matters and the 
recognition of religious liberty. Moreover, the totalitarian regimes, 
104. The Idea of a University, edited by Ian T. Ker, Oxford 1976, pp. 174-175. 
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whose fall this century has witnessed, have also adopted the regimen of 
religious neutrality recognizing the religious liberty of its citizens in all 
its aspects. These political developments undoubtedly signal a new era 
in the life of the Church which holds bright prospects as far as the 
subject of Church-State relations is concerned. It could only be hoped 
that more countries, especially the non-Christian States, would also 
eventually give way to a regimen more respectful of religious liberty 
which is today universally acknowledged as a fundamental human right. 
With respect to the science of Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum, New-
man's doctrine, being a faithful echo and exposition of the Vatican 
Council's teaching on the subject, can certainly provide a source of 
insights and point the direction for its development and application. 
Newman's concept of the religious neutrality of the State is founded on a 
profound understanding of the supernatural truths about man, the world, 
and the Church. It could, therefore, teach Christian nations how Church-
State separation and the pragmatic acceptance of religious pluralism 
could be made compatible with fidelity to these truths. 
Newman was, in fact, more preoccupied by what he considered as 
the greater problem that the Church faces in its relation to the modern 
world —the rejection of religion as a bond of society. That is why he 
unmasked the dangers behind the the concept of religious neutrality of 
the State especially if it stems from liberal principles which is based on 
religious indifferentism and a wrong idea of the liberty of conscience. 
The religious neutrality of the State is a political measure which meets 
the problem of religious pluralism in society, respecting the dignity of 
human conscience and avoiding the doctrinal issues involved. But the 
religious neutrality of the State is compatible with upholding the posi-
tive contribution of religion to society and the State should promote it by 
fostering the exercise of religious liberty. 
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